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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 540, United Plant Guard
Workers of America

OPINION
Case #1130 0851 79

and
Globe Security Systems, Inc.

The stipulated issues are:
1. Is the grievance arbitrable?
2. Did the Company violate the contract
when it went from fixed shifts to
rotating shifts beginning July 7, 1980?
If so what shall be the remedy?
3. Did the Company violate the contract
by having supervisors perform bargaining unit work? If so what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held in Boston, Massachusetts on May 14, 1981
at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The Company contends that the grievance is not arbitrable
because it was not filed for arbitration with the American
Arbitration Association within the contractually prescribed twenty
(20) days following the Step 3 grievance meeting.

The Company

notes that assuming the time limit began to run at the latest,
from its third step answer, said answer was given on September 10,
1980, and the Union's communication to the American Arbitration
Association was not until five months later, on February 20, 1981.
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The controlling contract language on this question is not
clear.

It provides for "notice of the request to appeal the case

to an impartial umpire ... in writing not later than twenty

(20)

days after the meeting provided for in Step 3." (Emphasis added.)
This could be logically interpreted either as requiring
notice, by the Union to the Company (i.e. a "request to appeal")
within the prescribed twenty days, or that it be filed with the
arbitrator or the arbitration forum within said twenty days.
Though the Company asserts the latter argument, the former
is equally plausible.

It is noted that the contract does not

require that the grievance be appealed to the arbitrator or the
arbitration forum within the time limit, but rather that a request
to appeal be given within that time.
To whom is a request to be made? Logically, it is made by
the moving party, here the Union to the responding party, here
the Company. As an appeal is made to the arbitrator or the
arbitration forum, the request to appeal, preliminary to the
appeal, may logically mean notice by one party to the other.
On this latter basis, the Union complied with the time limit.
It gave written notice to the Company on July 21, 1980 that the
grievance was "being submitted to Step 4 of the collective bargain
ing agreement."

Step 4 is the arbitration step.

That notice

followed what appears to have been a Company answer at the Step
3 level dated July 15, 1980, and was within the prescribed twenty
days .
Thereafter, following what appears to have been another,

-3or more formal third step meeting on August 26, 1980, the
Company's answer dated September 10, 1980 not only upheld the
Company's position on the grievance, but stated significantly
"we are prepared to handle through arbitration if this becomes
necessary." I deem this last statement as constituting an
acknowledgement by the Company that the grievance was ready for
arbitration; that the Union had previously given notice of a
request to appeal it to arbitration, by its earlier letter of
July 21, 1980; and that no further notice was required by the
Union to the Company to comply with the twenty day time limit.
On the foregoing basis the grievance is arbitrable.
The Company's unilateral installation of rotating shifts
had the obvious effect of nullifying that part of the contract
which gives employees the right to select their shifts on the
basis of seniority.

Under the rotating shift procedure, all

employees are required to rotate on and among each and all of
the shifts on a regular around-the-clock

schedule.

No employee

gets any preference of shift, nor can any remain on a particular
shift based on seniority as was the case when the shifts were
fixed.
Article XXI Section 3 of the contract provides in pertinent
part:
Employees will be given an opportunity
to select their shifts, on the basis of
seniority with the Employer once each
six (6) months.
Manifestly the

introduction of rotating shifts nullified

this contract provision.

Equally manifest is that a unilateral
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act which renders a bilaterally negotiated provision inoperative
or void, is inconsistent with the contract and hence a contract
violation.

The Arbitrator understands and appreciates the

Company's business reasons for installing the rotating shifts,
but the Arbitrator is bound to enforce the contract.

And where

the business needs (here the apparent wish of Boston Edison for
rotating shifts, by the contract security force) and the contract
are in conflict, the arbitrator must uphold the contract as bilaterally negotiated.
The exceptions set forth in Section 3 to "strict seniority"
for the selection of shifts do not include the introduction of
rotating shifts which perforce totally eliminate any shift
selection by seniority.

Those exceptions, not involved in this

case apply to "training" and to special circumstances

involving

the numbers and qualifications of employees on any given shift.
But those exceptions are all within the frame of a "fixed shift
schedule.
Accordingly the Company is directed to cease and desist from
further implementation of the rotating shifts; to return to the
fixed shifts that obtained previously; and to permit employees
to exercise their seniority rights under Article XXI Section 3
of the contract, subject to the specific exceptions therein.
The matter of "supervisors performing bargaining unit work
arose as a consequence of the rotating shifts.

Employees decline

to work overtime and the Company used supervisory employees to
fill the overtime needs.

It appeared at the hearing that inas-

much as this part of the grievance was a result of and attendant
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to the complaint over rotating shifts, and because

employees

had worked overtime under the fixed shifts, the issue would
resolve itself satisfactorily with a return to fixed shifts.
Therefore compliance with my Award by the Company and the
reestablishment of fixed shifts is all that need be said and
done about issue #3 in this arbitration.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 22,

1981

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

Voluntary Labor Arbitration

ADMINISTRATOR

Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 540, United Plant Guard
Workers of America

A W A R D
Case #1130 0851 79

and
Globe Security Systems, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties,
makes the following AWARD:

1) The grievance is arbitrable.
2) The Company violated the contract
when it went from fixed shifts to
rotating shifts beginning July 7,
1980.
The Company shall forthwith
discontinue rotating shifts and
shall forthwith restore the fixed
shifts which previously existed.
3) The Union's grievance that "supervisors are performing bargaining
unit work" is granted to the following extent.
With compliance with Award #2 above
the problem of "supervisors performing bargaining unit work" and the
grievance relating thereto should
automatically resolve itself. Under
that circumstance, (i.e. the restoration of fixed shifts) employees may
be required, and should expect to be
required to work reasonable amounts
of overtime provided they are given
HuX&W J[ . Guii!>\e notice.
MELANIB S. ADLEH
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 30-4668432
Qualified in Nassau County
Commission Expires Mar. 30, 19.^.3-

DATED: June 22, 1981
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this 22nd day of June, 1981, before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
Individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION .ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

VoluntarY_Labor_Arbitratign_Triburial
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION

Cornmunication Workers of America

AND

AWARD

_,
on->->,-, i\-,rr o^
Case #1330 0766 oO

and
ITT World Communications

Only Arbitrator Thomas A, Knowlton knows whether, as the Union
contends, his Award dated May 10, 1978 in case #1330 1035 77 between the
above-named parties unintentionally overlooked or forgot to deal with, the
question of damages or to retain jurisdiction over that question; or
whether, as the Company contends, he intended to deny any claim for monetary
relief by making no reference to or provisions for damages.
Only Dr. Knowlton can give an authoritative answer to those
questions. Dr. Knowlton is alive, well, practicing arbitration in this area
and is available to provide a clarification of his Award.
As the issue of what Dr. Knowlton intended with regard to damages
is a dispute between the parties, I am persuaded that that question should
be resolved by inquiry to and an answer by him. My Award in the instant case
is designed and intended to achieve that result.
Therefore the Undersigned, having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes the
following AWARD:
The parties shall jointly and
in writing reinstate Arbitrator
Thomas A. Knowlton's authority
in case #1330 1035 77 and shall
jointly ask him for a clarification of his Award in that case regarding the matter of damages or
monetary relief as asserted and
litigated in that case.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 23, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss-:
On this 23rd day of February, before me personally came and appeared
Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual described
in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union
AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan, Inc.

In accordance with Article XLII of the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named Union and
Company the Undersigned, designated as the Arbitrator, held
a hearing on October 12, 1981 in Atlanta, Georgia on the
Union's claims on behalf of certain employees for severance
pay, length of service payments and holiday pay resulting
from the shut-down of the Company's Butte Knitting Mills
Division.

Having considered the entire record before me, I
make the following AWARD:

1.

Severance_Pay
The Union's claim for severance
pay is denied.

2.

Length of Service Payments
The Union's claim for length of
service payments is granted as
follows:
a. In accordance with Section 15b
of the Butte Knitting Mills Supplemental Agreement effective June 1,
1979 the Company shall make contributions to the Health and Welfare Fund
of 2% of the payroll of all employees
who have been terminated in the calendar year 1981 in connection with

-2the shut-down of a plant or
facility, and who, but for
such termination would have
been employed three or more
years on December 1, 1981.

3. Holiday Pay
The Union's claim for holiday
pay is granted as follows:
a. Under Article XIII Section
2b of the Master Agreement the
Company shall grant to the employees holiday pay for all paid
holidays which have occurred or
will occur within ninety (90)
days following the last day of
work of said employees.
4. In full response to all the Union's
claims in this case the forgoing
Awards 1 through 3 shall apply to
employees of the Company's Butte
Knitting Mills Division who are
terminated in calendar year 1981
in connection with the shut-down
of a plant or facility, provided
such termination was neither voluntary nor for good and sufficient
cause and provided further that
such terminated employee is not
and has not been offered other
permanent employment with the
Company.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 21, 1981
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 21st day of October, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the forgoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union

OPINION

and
Jonathan Logan, Inc

On October 21, 1981 I rendered an Award in which I denied
the Union's claim for severance pay, and, as particularized in
that Award, granted the Union's claim for Length of Service
Payments and Holiday Pay for certain employees affected by the
shut-down of the Company's Butte Knitting Mills Division.

The following is my Opinion on those issues.

Severance Pay
The contract contains no provision for severance pay.

It

is universally well settled, and I have repeatedly so stated
in other decisions, that the Arbitrator is bound to the explicit
terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement and
may not legislate provisions therein which the parties have not
bilaterally negotiated.

Also, whether on an overall basis the Company has the
financial ability to grant severance pay is immaterial.

The

fact is, and the record establishes, that the Company's Butte
Knitting Mills Division has lost large sums of money over the
last several years.

The Company has established an economic

justification for closing that Division.
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I appreciate and am sympathetic to the economic difficulties
which confront the employees, some of long service, who have been
terminated as a result of the closing.

The Union has made an

eloquent equitable plea on their behalf.

No matter how moved

I may be by that plea, for the reasons indicated I am without
authority to order payment of severance pay.

Those examples pointed to by the Union in which in other
instances the Company granted severance allowances where the
collective bargaining agreements contained no such explicit
benefit, involved different contracts, a long standing practice
in a different market or bilaterally negotiated arrangements
between the parties involved.

Here there is no such practice,

supportive contract or arrangement.

Hence those cited practices

are inapplicable.

Length, of Service Payment

Section 15b of the Butte Knitting Mills supplemental agreement effective June 1, 1979 reads:
(b) The Employer shall also contribute toward the appropriate Health and Welfare Fund
two (2%) percent of a payroll consisting of
all employees who will be employed three (3)
or more years as of December 1st of that year.
Such payments shall be made not later than
October 1st to permit the Fund to provide
eligible employees with a length of service
payment.

The Division was closed prior to December 1, 1981.

The

Company asserts that because the employees were terminated before

-3and therefore not employed as of that date, it is not required
to make payments for them to the Health and Welfare Fund under
the foregoing contract provision.

The Company's position is not persuasive.

In my view the

December 1st date presupposes that the Company's Division will
be in existence as of that date.

It presupposes that some em-

ployees will be working on December 1st and that some others,
who had been laid off or otherwise terminated under customary
termination or lay off procedures would not be employed as of
December 1st.

In my judgement it was not intended nor does it

contemplate the unusual circumstance of the closing of an entire
Division, thereby foreclosing any of the affected employees from
employment as of December 1st.

Indeed, but for the Company's

decision to close the Division, it is logical and reasonable to
assume that the affected employees would have continued to be
employed as of December 1st.
otherwise.

There is no evidence to conclude

In short, I am not persuaded that where employment

as of December 1st has been totally obviated solely by the
Company's decision to close the Division, the Company can avoid
its obligations under the foregoing clause.

As I have ruled

that the clause was not intended to cover terminations due to
a total plant closedown, the Company remains obligated to make
the required contributions to the appropriate Health and Welfare
Fund covering the affected employees who were terminated in
calendar year 1981 as a result of the shutdown of a Company plant
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or facility and who but for such termination would have been
employed three or more years on December 1, 1981.

Holiday Pay

Article XIII Section 2b of the Master Agreement reads:

(b) An employee on leave of absence because of his own illness or death in his
immediate family or on layoff shall be
eligible for holiday pay if a paid holiday
occurs within ninety (90) consecutive calendar
days following the last day of work.

The narrow question is whether the affected employees were
"on layoff" within the meaning of the foregoing clause.

I am

satisfied that they were, both in a contractual and well accepted
labor relations sense.

Their terminations were not due to their

own fault or misconduct, but rather because there was a lack of
business to make the Division sufficiently profitable to remain
in operation.

The Division was closed because of a lack of

available, profitable work.

The traditional characteristic

of a layoff is when there is a diminution or cessation of
available work.

In my view that is what happened here.

Additionally, the foregoing contract provision does not
make a distinction between a temporary or a permanent layoff.
If the affected employees have contractual recall rights,
whether as a practical matter they would ever be recalled,
their terminations would meet the definition of a "layoff"
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and they would be eligible for the holiday pay within the explicit language of the contract.

Even if they do not have re-

call rights, their terminations, due to a cessation of available work still meet the classical definition of a "layoff",
albeit permanent.

And as the determinative contract clause

makes no distinction between temporary or permanent layoffs,
I am persuaded that the affected employees are eligible for
holiday pay under either theory.

Therefore the Company remains

obligated and shall grant to the employees terminated in the
calendar year 1981 as a result of the shutdown of a plant or
facility, holiday pay for all paid holidays which have occurred
or will occur within ninety (90) consecutive calendar days
following the last day of work of said employees.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: December 11, 1981

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union
AWARD
and
Jonathan Logan, Inc.

In accordance with Article XLII of the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named Union and
Company the Undersigned, designated as the Arbitrator, held
a hearing on October 12, 1981 in Atlanta, Georgia on the
Union's claims on behalf of certain employees for severance
pay, length of service payments and holiday pay resulting
from the shut-down of the Company's Butte Knitting Mills
Division.

Having considered the entire record before me, I
make the following AWARD:

1.

Severance Pay
The Union's claim for severance
pay is denied.

2.

Length of Service Payments
The Union's claim for length of
service payments is granted as
follows:
a. In accordance with Section 15b
of the Butte Knitting Mills Supplemental Agreement effective June 1,
1979 the Company shall make contributions to the Health and Welfare Fund
of 2% of the payroll of all employees
who have been terminated in the calendar year 1981 in connection with

-2the shut-down of a plant or
facility, and who, but for
such termination would have
been employed three or more
years on December 1, 1981.

3. Holiday Pay
The Union's claim for holiday
pay is granted as follows:
a. Under Article XIII Section
2b of the Master Agreement the
Company shall grant to the employees holiday pay for all paid
holidays which have occurred or
will occur within ninety (90)
days following the last day of
work of said employees.
4. In full response to all the Union's
claims in this case the forgoing
Awards 1 through 3 shall apply to
employees of the Company's Butte
Knitting Mills Division who are
terminated in calendar year 1981
in connection with the shut-down
of a plant or facility, provided
such termination was neither voluntary nor for good and sufficient
cause and provided further that
such terminated employee is not
and has not been offered other
permanent employment with the
Company.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 21, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 21st day of October, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the forgoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 3543, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
#80K/23299

and
Lord Burnham Corporation

In accordance with Article 10 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated May 1, 1980 between the above named Union and
Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear
and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement when it assigned
to Alice Seppell, an Administrative
Secretary exluded from the bargaining
unit, the work she previously performed
when she held the position of General
Secretary Senior in the bargaining unit?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Company in
Irvington, New York on February 25, 1981 at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The propriety of Ms. Seppell's change of status from that
of General Secretary Senior to Administrative Secretary is not
disputed. When the executive for whom she worked became an
officer of the Company she was reclassified as an Administrative
Secretary in accordance with the Company's policy to exclude
secretaries to Company officers from the bargaining unit.
What is challenged by the Union is her continued performance of much of the same work she performed when she was a
bargaining unit General Secretary Senior. Citing various sections
of the contract, the Union argues that Ms. Seppell is performing
work which belongs to the bargaining unit; that as a result the
bargaining unit has been reduced by one secretarial job (inasmuch
as her previous bargaining unit job was not filled); and that the
unit is thereby impermissibly eroded.

-2It is stipulated that between 80 and 85 per cent of the
work which Ms. Seppell performs as a non-bargaining unit
Administrative Secretary is the same work which she handled when
she was in the bargaining unit. The other 15 or 20 per cent is
undisputedly non-bargaining unit work and is not involved in this
case.

With regard to the disputed 80 to 85 per cent, the Company

asserts that it was Administrative Secretary's duties all along
and never bargaining unit work even when performed by Ms. Seppell
while she was a bargaining unit employee.
I do not accept the Company's latter contention. Neither
the contract nor any other document in evidence precisely defines
work that properly belongs to either the bargaining unit or to
those excluded from the unit. Nor are there job descriptions which
would assist in any such definition.

Therefore the question of

whether specific duties are properly within a job classification,
or in or out of the bargaining unit, is best answered by the
specific duties which an employee performs and to which he or
she is assigned in any given classification.

That Ms. Seppell

performed the disputed duties for a significant period of time
while she was a bargaining unit General Secretary Senior is
evidence that those duties were properly a part of that job
classification.
However this does not mean that the disputed work must be
assigned only to a bargaining unit General Secretary Senior.

For

the Union to prevail in that argument it must show by contract,
by job description and/or by practice that the bargaining unit
enjoys exclusivity with regard to that specific work.
The Union has not met that test. The evidence shows that
as a practice there has been a distinct overlap in the performance of these varied duties by both bargaining unit General
Secretaries Senior and non-bargaining unit Administrative Secretaries.

In the absence of a specific contract clause prohibiting

this overlapping jurisdiction and in the absence of delineated
job descriptions which distinguish the work of the General Secretary Senior from that of the Administrative Secretary, the regular
practice of having assigned the same duties to both job classifications establishes joint jurisdiction in both the bargaining
unit and at the non-bargaining unit level.
That the Union did not complain of prior instances in which
this work was performed by non-bargaining

unit Administrative

Secretaries because in those cases it did not result in a

-3diminution of the number of bargaining unit jobs, (i.e. the
bargaining unit vacancy created by the change was filled by
another employee) does not lessen the fact that by practice both
classifications, within and outside of the bargaining unit, did
the same work. That practice established joint or concurrent
jurisdiction, and though the Union's prior acquiescence is explainedjits inactivity can hardly serve as a reservation of
rights it attempts to assert in this case.
Accordingly, the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the
collective bargaining agreement
when it assigned to Alice Seppell,
an Administrative Secretary excluded from the bargaining unit,
the work she previously performed
when she held the position of General
Secretary Senior in the bargaining
unit.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 29, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

;

On this 29th day of May, 1981 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 420, District Council 37
American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A - 1059 80

and
New York City Health & Hospitals
Corporation (Seaview Hospital)

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer took wrongful
disciplinary action against employee
Dorothy Lane? If so should the thirty
day suspension be rescinded and should
she be made whole for the time and wages
lost?
Hearings were held at the Hsopital and at the Office of
Collective Bargaining respectively on November 18 and December 9,
1980 at which time Ms. Lane, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Employer
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The accusation against the grievant, a nurses aide, for
which she was suspended thirty days is that she repeatedly slapped
a patient, Anna Eschert.

The grievant denies the charge.

The Employer's case against the grievant is based on the
reports and testimony of Rosemarie Bohen who was Mrs. Eschert's
roommate at the hospital and who reported and testified that she
witnessed the grievant slap Mrs. Eschert on the night of April 30,
1980.

(Mrs. Eschert died of natural causes prior to this
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arbitration. )
The Union contends that because of her advanced age, the
effects of a stroke and her withdrawn and unsettled demeanor
resulting from her new arrival as a patient in the hospital at
the time of the alleged incident, Mrs. Bohen is not a reliable
or credible witness.

I do not agree.

I found her to be rational,

lucid, calm and determined in her testimony and unimpeached in
cross-examination.

I accept her testimony as thruthful and

accurate.
It is significant to me that Mrs. Bohen has been both consistent and persistent in what she reported.

Initially she told

the grievant at the time she claims the incident occurred that
she'would report" her.

Thereafter, a day or so later she recited

what she saw to one of her relatives, who in turn reported it to
the Employer.

Thereafter Mrs. Bohen repeated it to representatives

of the Employer when they interviewed her.

And subsequently she

testified about the incident at this arbitration hearing.

Her

consistency in each of these settings over the period of time involved persuades me that she was determined to report and correct
a wrong, and if what she claims she saw was only imagined or

contrived, I do not think she would have been so persisent or
remembered so well.
I also consider significant the exchange between the grievant
and Mrs. Bohen at the time involved.

It is undisputed that Mrs.

Bohen stated to the grievant that she "would report her" when Mrs.
5ohen claimed she saw the grievant slap Mrs. Eschert.

It is
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acknowledged that the grievant immediately replied to Mrs. Bohen
"I will report you."
argumentative

I construe the grievant's reply as defensive,

and even threatening.

Had there been no slapping I

do not think the grievant would have so replied.

Rather the reply

if any, would have been questioning and of a surprised nature and
tone.

But to reply to the statement "I will report you" with the

counter-threat "I will report you"

leads me to believe that the

grievant had something to hide and had done something about which
she was spontaneously defensive.

I conclude that what she was

defensive about was the slapping.
I discount the testimony of Naomi Black another nurses aide.
She testified, as did the grievant, that the grievant had some
difficulty with Mrs. Eschert, because Mrs. Eschert would not remain
in the bathroom as instructed while the grievant changed the bedding; and that each time Mrs. Eschert came out of the bathroom the
grievant led her back into the bathroom by her nightgown, but at
no time did she slap her.

Ms. Black states that she saw this

activity because she had completed her work in the room directly
across the corridor and stood in the doorway of Mrs. Eschert's room
and watched the grievant so engaged.

Ms. Black states that it is

the practice of the nurses aides to work in rooms parallel and
across the corridor so that if either of them needs assistance the
other aide would be available at approximately the same location.
This last explanation is probative in my conclusions regarding
this case.

If, as Ms. Black states, she had finished her work and

thereafter watched the grievant having difficulty keeping Mrs.
Eschert in the bathroom, she would and/•should have then assisted

-4the grievant.

That would have been the simple and expected imple-

mentation of the stated purpose of two nurses aides working in
rooms parallel to each other.

That Ms. Black now only reports that

she stood in or by the doorway and observed the difficulty the
grievant had with Mrs. Eschert, and did nothing to assist, leads
me to conclude that that is not the way it happened.

Instead, I

believe that Ms. Black was at work in an opposite room assigned to
her and saw none or only part of what the grievant was doing and was
not in a position to observe or know the full events and mole particularly whether the slapping took place.
Under all the circumstances I find that the Employer has
met the requisite burden of proof in a discipline case to sustain
its disciplinary action.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not take wrongful
disciplinary action against Dorothy
Lane. The thirty day suspension was
for just cause and is upheld.

DATED: January 2, 1981
STATE OF New York ) SS- .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this 2nd day of January, 1981, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Professional Staff Association
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #19 39 0201 80

New York State United Teachers

In accordance with Article III of the collective bargaining agreement dated September 17, 1979 between the above named
Union and Employer, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Does the letter dated October 6, 1980
from Stanley Kern to Kevin Berry violate Article V A and/or Article XI A,
B and H of the Agreement? If so, what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the New York City office of the
Employer on February 11, 1981 at which time the grievant and
representatives of the Union and Employer appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived. The parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant, Kevin Berry, is a Field Representative who
the Employer has assigned to its Mid-Hudson Regional Office in
Kingston, New York for the past four years. The grievant requested the Mid-Hudson assignment even
Albany, New York and had formerly been
Albany office. The grievant testified
Coordinator, John Fallen, afforded him

though he resides in
assigned to the Employer's
that the prior Regional
a great deal of flexi-

bility in determining whether to be physically present at the
Mid-Hudson office on a daily basis. The grievant therefore
frequently worked out of the Albany Regional Office, NYSUT Headquarters in Albany, and his Albany home.
Stanley Kern became the Mid-Hudson Regional Coordinator
approximately three years ago. He became concerned about the
grievant's practice of working in the Albany office rather than
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Kern indicated this concern to the grievant in

December 1977. The grievant claims that he complied with Kern's
instruction except on two special occasions. The grievant,
however, did continue to work at his home.

Kern objected to

this practice and orally informed the grievant in the late winter
or early spring of 1980, Kern stated that a review of the
grievant's weekly activity report by the Albany Headquarters
called attention to this practice.

The grievant testified that

he understood the objection to be solely the way he completed
the weekly activity report and so he continued to work at his
home. Kern orally warned the grievant again in May 1980 that
"You are going to have to stop working from your home."

The

grievant asserts that he complied with this instruction between
May 1980 and October 1, 1980. It is undisputed that the grievant
received an approved, 11 week vacation during the summer of 1980.
On October 1, 1980 the grievant telephoned the Kingston
office and reported that he would be at home that day.

On

October 2, 1980 he reported to the Kingston office and requested
Kern to treat October 1 as a schedule readjustment day. Kern
refused to do so and issued the October 6, 1980 letter that is
the subject of the instant grievance.
During its opening statement at the arbitration hearing,
the Union indicated that it was not challenging the Employer's
action of docking the grievant one day's pay for an unauthorized
absence on October 1, 1980, which is referred to in, the first
paragraph of the letter.

Therefore that issue is not before the

Arbitrator.
The second paragraph of the October 6 letter sets forth
daily reporting procedures for the grievant.

It, together with

Paragraph 5, which reviews certain job requirements of the
grievant, I find to be proper and reasonable exercises of managerial authority.

The grievant testified that on October 1, 1980

he stayed at home because he had nothing to do that day for NYSUT
and it was therefore unnecessary for him to come into the office.
He further testified that he spent the day caulking windows at
his home "thinking about NYSUT," and that "part of his job is to
think about NYSUT." I consider this a violation by the grievant
of previous instructions regarding "working at home" and a misuse

-3of his work time and responsibilities as a field representative.
Indeed it appears to me to have been a defiant reaction to the
verbal instructions that he was no longer to work at home.

There

fore Kern's decision to address the grievant's job requirements
in the letter and to set forth reporting procedures, albeit
specifically for the grievant, are both understandable and
reasonable under those circumstances and consistent with the
Employer's authority under Article XI F and H of the Agreement.
Accordingly my Award shall provide that Para-raphs 2 and 5 remain instact.
The third paragraph of the letter indicated the possibility
of future schedule readjustments. Article V A provides in pertinent part:
"When an inordinate amount of time is
spent in the performance of his/her
assignment, an employee, upon notifying
the office of his/her immediate supervisor, shall readjust his/her schedule
if there does not exist an organizational
need for such employee's services."
Vito DeLeonardis, Executive Director of the Employer,
testified that this provision was designed to deal with the issue
of "compensatory time" and has not been interpreted by an arbitrator heretofore. The clause expressly requires the employee
to prove that an "inordinate amount of time" has been spent in
performing an assignment before the clause is triggered.

The

employee must then notify the office of the immediate supervisor
before readjusting the schedule. Whether the employee must
secure prior approval from the supervisor depends upon the meaning of the clause "if there does not exist an organizational need
for such employee's services." That clause is noticeably silent
as to who is to make that determination.

I therefore

that initially an attempt is to be made to arrive at

conclude
a decision

jointly. The employee must be able to establish to his/her
supervisor that a schedule readjustment will not compromise the
needs of the organization. In the absence of an objection by the
supervisor, the employee may make the adjustment.
If the supervisor does object to the schedule readjustment because from the
supervisor's perspective the organization's needs would be
prejudiced, then the employee and the supervisor should attempt
to resolve the deadlock on a joint basis. If there is no

-4resolution of this impasse, the employee must comply with the
employer's instruction subject to challenge through the grievance
procedure. On this basis, my Award shall provide that paragraph
three remain unchanged.
The fourth paragraph of the letter found the grievant to
be derelict in his duty because he did not establish visual
contact with his locals during September 1980. The testimony
proved that the grievant did establish visual contact with 5 of
his 12 locals during the month of September. The testimony also
showed that the grievant had written a letter in the beginning
of September to the presidents of each local in order to reestablish contact. On cross-examination Kern testified that he
had been unaware that the grievant had sent that letter to each
local president. Although the letter did not constitute visual
contact, the purpose of the letter was to establish a relationship between the grievant and the local presidents for the coming
school year. Having done this and in the absence of a clear
requirement that each representative must visit each local on a
monthly basis, I am unable to find the grievant derelict in his
duties solely for failing to visit 7 locals during the month of
September.

As a result, the Employer's action in this regard is

not reasonable and is therefore violative of Article XI H of the
Agreement.

My Award shall therefore order that paragraph four be

deleted.
Paragraph six deems the letter to be a written warning.
The Employer and the grievant had had previous discussions regarding where the grievant is to report to work. It is undisputed that the grievant's office is located at the Mid-Hudson
Regional Office. Although the record reveals that at one time
there was a problem with the grievant working at the Albany
Regional Office and at NYSUT Headquarters, the grievant eliminated
this problem.

I view the two incidents when the grievant used

the Albany Office--once for an arbitration witness' convenience
and once for contract negotiations involving a teachers union in
West Rutland, Vermont--to be proper and not subject to discipline
within Article XI H.

However, my previously stated opinion on

the issue of "working at home" supports Managements corrective
discipline as envisioned by Article XI F and H. Therefore, the
reference and objection to "working at home" as a basis of a
written warning

is a proper exercise of managerial authority.

-5Acccrdingly, my Award shall order the reference to "the Albany
Regional Office, or Albany Headquarters" to be deleted and the
balance of paragraph six to remain intact.
With the foregoing decision, the Arbitrator makes the
following observation. For members of NYSUT to be serviced
effectively, the Regional Coordinator and the grievant must
establish an appropriate working relationship. The differences
that are the subject of this case have been adjudicated by this
Opinion and Award. For the future I encourage Messrs. Berry and
Kern to put these disagreements behind them and to proceed
cooperatively in fulfilling their fundamental and mutual responsibilities to serve the needs of the NYSUT members.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The letter dated October 6, 1980 from
Stanley Kern to Kevin Berry does or
does not violate the Agreement as specified below and shall be revised as
indicated:
1.

Paragraph 1 is unchallenged and shall
remain unchanged.

2.

Paragraphs 2 and 5 do not violate the
Agreement and shall remain unchanged.

3.

Paragraph 3 does not violate the Agreement and shall remain unchanged,

4.

Paragraph 4 violates Article XI H and
shall be deleted.

5.

In part, Paragraph 6 violates Article
XI F and H and shall be amended by deleting the phrase "the Albany Regional
Office, or Albany Headquarters." The
balance of Paragraph 6 does not violate
the Agreement and shall remain unchanged.

Eric J., Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 15, 1981
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 15th day of May 1981, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case Nos. 1-80-140
A-79-104

New York Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the suspension
of William Moody? If not what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held on February 2, February 4 and March 23,
1981 at which time Mr. Moody, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
briefs.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Both sides filed

The Company filed a reply-brief.
On January 31, 1979, the grievant, a building mechanic,

drove his Company truck while intoxicated and had a chargeable
accident.

Immediately thereafter he entered South Oaks, an alco-

holic rehabilitation facility.

When released from South Oaks in

April, 1979, the Company discharged him

Some twenty-one months

later, on January 26, 1981, he was reinstated by the Company without back pay, with the interim period treated as a disciplinary
suspension.

The propriety of that disciplinary action is the issu

in this case.
Though the evidence discloses that the grievant had a
drinking problem for some time, it was not authoritatively
known that he was an alcoholic until treated at South Oaks.
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That he is an alcoholic was both acknowledged and undisputed
in the course of the arbitration hearing.
Absent a contract provision, other bilateral arrangements,
or a binding practice to the contrary, an employer has the
right to discharge an employee who drives a company vehicle
while intoxicated and who, as a consequence, causes an accident.
In that circumstance, mitigation of that penalty because the
employee suffers from the disease of alcoholism is a matter
within the employer's discretion and not for the arbitrator.
If the employer exercises that discretion by establishing
circumstances or criteria for the imposition of the penalty
less than discharge, the union's right to challenge is limited
to whether the circumstances and criteria are arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable and/or if those established conditions and standards are unevenhandedly or discriminatorily
applied or denied to employees similarly situated.
Here there is no special contract provision dealing with
the matter of disciplinary penalties for an alcoholic. Nor do
I find any bilaterally negotiated or agreed to arrangement or
a practice of mitigation applicable to the essential facts of
this case.
Instead, the Company has established a Policy under which
it will consider mitigating or not imposing disciplinary penalties for employees who are alcoholics and who commit disciplinary offenses.

Relevant to this case are two specific

Policy conditions, both of which the grievant failed to meet.
One is that the affected employee undertake an alcholic rehabilitation program that is under the control of or approved by

-3the Company's Medical Department.

The other is that the

affected employee be in such rehabilitation program before
or at the time the disciplinary offense occurs.
"umbrella"

This latter

of protection is referred to in the Company "Policy"

as follows:
During the period of cooperative rehabilitation (in which the employee is cooperating with the program of rehabilitation
specified or approved by Medical) the
Company recognizes that occasional lapses
may occur but no disciplinary action should
be taken by supervision without consultation with the Medical Department."(emphasis added)
The foregoing means to me that the matter of a penalty
in response to a disciplinary offense will be considered only
when participation in the rehabilitation program predates or
coincides with the offense.

In the instant case the grievant

entered a rehabilitation program after the incident for which
he was disciplined.
As the Company's policy with regard to help and consideration accorded an employee who is an alcoholic or who suffers
from a drinking problem comes into play only when and after
the employee qualifies for the "umbrella" protection, I cannot find that the Company violated its Policy by disciplining
the grievant for an offense which took place before his rehabilitative effort, and before the effective point of that Policy.
The South Oaks rehabilitation facility was not a program
under the auspices of or approved by the Company's Medical
Department.

However I do not have to decide whether its pro-

gram was better or as good as the program sponsored by the

-4Medical Department or any other program approved by Medical,
or whether it was arbitrary or discriminatory for the Company
to fail or to decline to give its approval to South Oaks.

Nor

need I decide whether earlier referrals of Company personnel
to South Oaks on an informal or even organized basis constituted
"constructive" approval.

Such determinations are not necessary

because the grievant did not meet the earlier condition, namely
the requirement that he be "cooperating with (a) program of
rehabilitation..." when the "lapse" or offense took place.
That the Company knew of the grievant's drinking habits
before he committed this offense does not mean that it waived
its right to impose discipline for the serious drinking-related
incident involved in this case.
employer's willingness

It is well settled that an

to help employees with drinking problems

and institutionalized programs to assist them are designed for
and applicable to normal employment circumstances, but not as
substitutes for discipline including discharge if an alcoholrelated disciplinary offense occurs.

In short, I view any such

program by an employer, and more particularly the Company's
program herein as preventative and rehabilitative, not as a bar
to the exercise of the Company's inherent disciplinary
I

authority

when preventive procedures and rehabilitation fail.
Considering the Company's legitimate interest in according
its employees preventive and rehabilitative programs for drinking problems and alcoholism, so as, in part at least, to obviate
disciplinary difficulties, I cannot find the requirement that
the employee be under the "umbrella" of protection before he

-5is eligible for mitigation or waiver of a disciplinary penalty,
to be an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the Company's
discretion in deteriming the conditions under which any such
consideration or mitigation will apply.
Examples cited by the Union of cases in which discharge
or other discipline was not imposed for alleged alcohol-related
offenses, and where the affected employees were not at the
time in an approved alcohol rehabilitation program are different or unclear factually, and/or involve employees not similarly
situated to the circumstance of the grievant's case.

As such

they do not support the claim that the grievant was discriminatorily treated.
As the Company had the right to impose the penalty of
discharge under the circumstances of this case, it follows
that it committed no violation by transforming that discharge
into a twenty-one month suspension-a penalty less than discharge
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the suspension
of William Moody.

DATED: August 12, 1981
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this 12th day of August, 1981, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America
OPINION AND AWARD
and
New York Telephone

Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the grievant, Shawn Sullivan suspended for just cause?
Hearings were held on August 11 and September 2, 1981 at
which time the grievant and representatives of the above named
Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant, a steward, was suspended five days for improperly taking a Company record from a fellow employee who was
responsible for maintaining that record; retaining the record
in his exclusive possession (by placing it in his truck) without authority; and refusing or failing to return the record to
the Company when directed to do so by supervision.

The Company

asserts that the grievant's conduct in this connection was in
violation of rules set forth in the booklet "The Codes We Work
By," particularly the section requiring all employees to "be
alert at all times to safeguarding records...."
Some of the elements of the Company's case have been proved
and some have not.

I find it unnecessary to determine whether

the grievant took the records directly from the person of the
employee responsible for maintaining them or rather removed them
from the cafeteria table where, the Union asserts, the latter
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employee left them.

That determination is unnecessary because

I am not persuaded that at the time the records came into the
grievant's possession he knew it was "an official Company
record."

The documents in question were on hand drawn charts

with handwritten notations, and not on any formal printed form.
By appearance alone it is questionable whether the grievant knew
or should have known at that point that the documents were
official records of the amount of time certain employees took
to complete assignments, recorded at the specific request of
supervision.

Though the testimony at the hearing by Mr. Beckford,

the employee responsible for keeping the records, was that he
told the grievant that he was keeping the time records at the
specific request of supervision, there is substantial evidence
to the contrary.

Not only the grievant but several other em-

ployees who claimed they were present in the cafeteria at the
time that the grievant challenged Beckford regarding the propriety of keeping such records, stated that Beckford said he was
doing it on his own and was not instructed to do so by supervision
I am inclined to credit the latter testimony as accurate.
In view of the fact that the Union, and particularly the grievant
in his capacity as a shop steward, objected to surveillance by
one union member of the amount of time other bargaining unit employees took to complete assignments, I think it probable that
faced with an accusation that he was doing something contrary to
Union policy, Beckford chose to avoid criticism from his peers
by explaining that he was not keeping the records for any
official or objectionable purpose, but rather "on his own."

-3Under the forgoing circumstance

I cannot conclude that at

the time the grievant took the records from Beckford or removed
them from the cafeteria table, (assuming Beckford left them at
that location), he knew it was an official Company record.
However he is not excused.

Thereafter he was interviewed

by a representative of management about the incident and instructed to return the records forthwith.

With that directive he

knew or should have known that the documents involved were Company
records, maintained in accordance with managerial instructions.
He should have then returned them without failure or delay.
hold him responsible for not doing so.

I

He explained that in some

manner unknown to him the records which he had placed in his
truck were removed from the binder and disappeared. And it was
the binder alone which he gave to the management representative.
I do not accept his claim of innocence.
which he placed the records.

It was his truck in

I am not persuaded that the records

were removed from the binder and from inside the truck without
his participation, knowledge or responsibility.

By returning

only the binder to the Company he exhibited a defiance of
managerial instructions, and by doing so demonstrated his knowledge or recognition, at least at that point that the documents
were "Company records."

His retention of the records in his

possession when he was not the person authorized to maintain
custody thereof is inconsistent with the Code duty of "safeguarding. "
In short, the grievant committed part of the offense charged
namely his retention of ani refusal to return an official Company

-4record when directed to do so.

He did not commit that portion

of the offense charging him with taking or removing an official
Company record without authorization.

Under the circumstances

a portion of the disciplinary suspension imposed is appropriate
and a portion should be reversed.

I conclude that the appropriate

penalty under these particular circumstances

is to reduce the

five day suspension by one-half to a suspension of two and onehalf days.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The five day suspension of Shaw^Sullivan
was not for just cause. There is just
cause for a suspension of two and one-half
days. Accordingly the suspension is reduced to the latter amount and Mr. Sullivan
shall be made whole for the difference.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 20, 1981
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 20th day of October, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
forgoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
In the Matter of the Arbitration
-betweenNORTH MERRICK FACULTY ASSOCIATION

x

:
: Case No: 1739-0256-80
:

AWARD OF
ARBITRATOR

•
•

-and«
•

BOARD OF EDUCATION NORTH MERRICK U.F.S.D.
•

Re:

Evaluation of Ms. Annette Montanile

In accordance with the applicable provisions of a
contract existing between the North Merrick U.F.S.D. and the
North Merrick Faculty Association, hereinafter referred to as
"District" and "Association" respectively, and in accordance
with the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association, Eric J. Schmertz, Esq., having been selected as Arbitrator, a hearing was held in Merrick, New York, on September 17,
1981.
The Association and the Grievant were represented by
Jeffrey P. Englander, Esq.of Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen,
Rosenthal & Rosenberg. The District was represented by Richard
S. Naidich, Esq. of Naidich & Smolev, P.C.
Ms. Annette Montanile, the Grievant, appeared and
testified as a witness for the Association.
The District's witnesses were Dr. Joseph Tucker, a
principal and Dr. June Irvin, Superintendent of Schools.
FACTS:
The Grievant, Annette Montanille, has been a teacher
in the North.Merrick U.F.S.D. for 25 years. On June 11, 1980,
a year-end evaluation was made by Dr. Tucker, Building Principal,

of Ms. Montanile's performance during the preceding school year.
The evaluation consisted of two type-written pages together with
photostatic copies of seven letters purportedly annexed as substantiation of the contents of the evaluation made by Dr. Tucker.
Each of the letters annexed to the evaluation appear to
have been from parents of children taught by Ms. Montanile and
bear dates of March 20, 1980 (two letters), March 21, 1980, March
22, 1980, April 28, 1980, April 30, 1980 and May 19, 1980. In
each instance the names of the students and the names of the
parents have been deleted.
In June of 1980, the original letters, copies of which
were annexed to the evaluation, were placed by the District in
Ms. Montanile's personnel file in a sealed envelope and have remained there through the date of the Arbitration. The parties
agree that Ms. Montanile was given a copy of the evaluation together with the annexed copies of the letters, the names of the
students and parents having been deleted. The parties further
agree that Ms. Montanille was not shown the original letters.
DISPUTE:
The dispute, as submitted by the Association, involved
the meaning, interpretation and application of ARTICLE XXIV, ParagraphsA, B and C of the contract between the parties (a successor
agreement was in effect at the time of the Hearing, however the
parties agree that the applicable provisions are identical in
both contracts) . Specifically the Association claims that the
evaluation, in the form submitted to Ms. Montanile, denied her
rights and protections accorded under the various paragraphs of
ARTICLE XXIV.
The Grievant claims that the evaluation should be removed from her file and thereafter be rewritten to delete all
references to the letters or their substance, and that the copies
of the parents' letters should not be annexed to such redrafted
evaluation. The Grievant further urges that the original letters
should be removed from her personnel file. Furthermore, the
Grievant asks that reference to a prior incident involving one
particular student, likewise be deleted from the evaluation since
that incident was the subject of a prior grievance proceeding
which was subsequently resolved by the parties in a manner favorable to the Grievant.
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The District argues that the evaluation is proper as
contemplated by the contract between the parties and that the
reference to, and inclusion of, copies of parents letters,
albeit with the names of parents and students deleted, does not
violate the agreement between the parties.
The District contends that the deletion of the names in
the copies submitted to Ms. Montanile was done so for the protection of the rights of the students involved. The District
urges that even in the event that the evaluation is found to
have been improper, that the original letters should be maintained in the personnel file.

DECISION:
The Arbitrator finds that the evaluation dated June 11,
1980 is improper. While it is understandable that the District
would seek to protect the identities of the children and parents
who complain of or criticize a school teacher, the rights of that
teacher in responding to such criticism must be considered paramount .
Article XXIV of the contract provides in pertinent part
that "any teacher dissatisfied with his evaluation shall have
the right to file a written reply which shall be appended to the
evaluation." I specifically find that it was not possible for
the grievant to compose effectively a written reply in this case,
since the identities of the children and parents were withheld
from her.
For that reason, I order that the evaluation be removed
from the Grievant's personnel file and redrawn removing the last
paragraph of such evaluation. Since that portion of the evaluation specifically refers to the letters received by the District,
I also direct that the amended evaluation should not contain the
copies of letters previously annexed. Additionally, since it is
clear from the evidence that the substance of the first complete
sentence on the second page of the evaluation, beginning "This
year it was necessary . . . " was aired and informally resolved
through prior exercise of the contractual grievance machinery.
I will also order that that sentence of the evaluation be deleted
with the understanding that the redrawn evaluation shall make no
reference to the incident in question. Once the evaluation has
been amended in accordance with the foregoing it should be delivered to Ms. Montanile who shall then have a reasonable opportunity to comment on its contents in accordance with the terms
of the contract.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, I find that the original
letters have been properly placed in Ms Montanile's personnel
file. It appears to me that they were filed within three months
of their receipt by the District in accordance with the requirements of the contract. I see no sense or purpose to require the
District to remove these letters since the weight of the testimony at the hearing clearly indicated that it has been the District's practice and policy to include letters from parents where
deemed appropriate, in teachers personnel files. It further
appears from the testimony that on prior occasions such letters
have been included in Ms. Montanile's personnel file. Without
characterizing the contents of such letters, I can find no reasonable basis to exclude them since it is acknowledged that on prior!
occasions favorable as well as unfavorable letters from parents)
have been included in this Grievant's file.
The Association argues that in failing to show to
Ms. Montanile the original letters, the District waived its
right to retain them in the file since the contract requires that
any material of a derogatory nature placed in a teacher's personnel file must be submitted to the teacher. I need not determine
whether or not in other instances the District has the right to
place material of a derogatory nature in a teacher's personnel
file and subsequent thereto allow the teacher an opportunity to
read the material. I am satisfied that in this case the teacher
was made aware of the contents of the letters, prior to the
letters having been placed in her file and do not believe that the
deletion of the names of the parents and students should be a
basis for ordering the District to remove the original letters.
As a safeguard to Ms. Montanile's rights, I order that
the District forthwith permit her to view the original letters
and allow her reasonable time thereafter to comment on their contents should she so desire.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATE: January 15, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss< .
COUNTY OF New York ) "
On this 15th day of January, 1982, before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Paper Handlers' Union No. 1

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 80K19950

and
Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether Michael Castella was terminated on April 7, 1980 for just cause?
If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 1, 1980 at which time Mr,
Castella, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared. All
concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The
Arbitrator's Oath was waived. The parties filed post-hearing
briefs.
The grievant, a fork lift truck driver, was terminated
because he did not meet the physical requirements of that job.
When he was 13 or 14 years old the grievant lost the
sight in his right eye. This disability was not known to the
Company when he began employment as a lift truck driver ten years
ago in 1971. It came to the Company's attention in March of 1980
when the sightless eye was surgically removed because of an
infection.
The Company's physical qualifications for drivers includes "vision...of at least 20/40 in each eye...." or in other
words sight with both eyes.
The Company stipulates that the grievant had a good driving and operating record, had no accidents, and that though he
did not disclose his disability to the Company when originally
hired, the instant termination was not for that reason and that
this is not a disciplinary case.
The record also shows that the grievant drives a car and
has done so without accident, and that subsequent to his termination he obtained jobs driving a fork lift truck without accident

-2or incident for other employers.
Though the grievant's work for ten years was unblemished
by accident or other incident which could relate to his monocular
vision, and though he is to be commended for apparently overcoming
this disability in connection with his employment, I cannot find
the Company's minimum qualifications for drivers of vehicles to
be arbitrary or unreasonable. The fact is that from the time the
Company learned of his monocular condition it legally exposed
itself to liability if an accident related to that condition
thereafter occurred.

Nor is it unreasonable for the Company to

have higher physical standards for the operators of its trucks,
including a fork lift truck, than is required by regulations
applicable to the operation of automobiles by the general public.
Therefore the Company had the right to remove the grievant
from the job of fork lift operator.

But I am not persuaded that

it had the right to terminate him from its employ at that point,
His disability, in light of the Company's physical qualifications
for drivers, meant that work as a fork lift operator was no
longer available to him. I deem it comparable to when there is
a diminution or lack of available work in a particular job classification.

Under that circumstance, employees affected by the

unavailability of work have the opportunity to be placed in other
vacant job classifications in which work was available and/or
the right, based on seniority, to bump into other eligible
positions which they are qualified to perform and which are
occupied by less senior employees.
Section 18 (PRIORITY) of the collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties supports the latter procedure
It provides for plantwide seniority in cases of layoffs. It
means that where there is a lack of work or a diminution of work
the "last man employed", or in other words the employee with the
least seniority shall be "the first to be laid off."
first to lose his active employment).

(i.e. the

Hence, if an employee is

removed from the job of fork lift operator because work in that
classification is no longer available to him, he should be
allowed to bump into another job in the plant which he is capable
of performing and which is occupied by a junior employee.

Having

interpreted the grievants removal from the fork lift driver job
because of his monocular condition as synonymous with a lay off
for lack of available work in that classification, he should have

-3been advised of and given the opportunity to retain employment
under the provisions of Section 18 of the contract.

Also the

Company should have determined whether there was a vacant job
into which the grievant could be placed, and if so it should have
offered him that chance.
Though the record does not disclose whether there were
any such vacancies, or whether the grievant could have bumped
into some other job and if so which, I am satisfied that with ten
years of seniority he could and should have been retained in one
capacity or the other and that under either or both circumstances
there was some other job, either equally rated with the fork lift
driver position or of lesser rank, which the grievant could have
performed and to which his seniority would have entitled him.
There is no evidence that the Company offered him either opportunity or accorded him either right.
Under the foregoing circumstance the grievant!s termination was not proper.

He should have been continued in the

Company's employ until the Company closed its plant and ended
its operations on June 29, 1980.

Therefore his discharge is

reversed and his employment record should show a continuity of
employment until that latter date. Inasmuch as the evidence
shows that the grievant secured employment elsewhere during the
period of his termination, my Award will not provide for back pay
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the termination of Michael Castella on April 7,
1980, His discharge is reversed. His
records should show a continuity of employment until the Company closed its terminal
on June 29, 1980. He shall not receive
back pay for the period April 7 to June
29, 1980.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 23, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) '
On this 23rd day of March, 1981. before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
UAW Local 1832

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #LG057
FMCS #81K/10736

and
Peterbilt Motors Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article 6.03 d
of the collective bargaining agreement
in connection with the termination of
Max D. Creviston? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held in Nashville, Tennessee on June 16,
1981 at which time Mr. Creviston, hereinafter referred to as
the grievant and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic

record was taken and both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
Article 6.03 d of the contract reads:
An employee shall have his seniority and
his name removed from the seniority list
for any of the following reasons:
d. Failure of a laid-off employee to
return to work within five (5)
working days after being notified
by certified mail to report to work.
The Company contends that the grievant was "notified" of
his recall to work within the meaning of the foregoing contract
provision, but failed to respond.

Following expiration of the

specified time limit the Company notified him of his termination,
There is no question that the Company mailed a recall
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notice to the grievant by certified mail.

It is undisputed that

he did not personally receive it.
The Union contends that not only did the grievant not
receive the certified letter but did not know of its existence
or that he had been recalled.

The Company asserts that from

common knowledge in the community he knew of the recall; knew
that a certified letter had been sent to him; that the letter
contained a recall notice and that that knowledge constituted
notification within the meaning of the contract.
Based on the record I conclude that the grievant knew that
a certified letter had been sent to him by the Company and that
the certified letter contained notice of his recall to work.
Under those circumstances I find that the notification requirement of Article 6.03 d was met.
I accept as accurate the testimony of the employee of the
postal service who stated that two attempts were made to deliver
the certified letter to the grievant personally at his home and
that on both occasions the usual post office notice was left
advising that a certified letter was at the post office.
I accept as accurate and credible the testimony of Evelyn
Parker, a Company timekeeper, that while attending a junior high
school football game she saw the grievant, whom she did not then
know but later identified, and heard him state to a companion
that he "had a registered letter", that he "had not picked it up
yet", and "was not ready to return to work yet."
Though Miss Parker's initial identification of the grievant
by a single photograph shown to her by a Company personnel
officer might not meet the requisite standard in a criminal

-3investigation, the parties need not be reminded that this is
not a criminal case and that the evidentiary standards in an
arbitration are less rigid.

More important however is that

Miss Parker's proximity to the grievant at the football game
was a matter of feet, and that her later and in-person identification was positive and unequivocal.

I find no reason in

the record why she would fabricate or misrepresent what she saw
and heard.

Therefore I conclude that her observations and what

she overheard were accurately reported both to the Company and
at the arbitration hearing.

Even the single photograph shown

to her by the personnel officer was not as unorthodox as it
might seem.

Only a few employees had not responded to the re-

call notices, and the evidence indicates that the grievant was
the only one who fit Miss Parker's description.

Hence it was

not unreasonable albeit perhaps imprudent for the personnel
officer to show her only one photograph.
The results of the polygraph test which the Union offered
in evidence in an effort to show that the grievant told the truth
when he stated that he was not at the football game, is not
probative evidence in refutation.

The administrator of the test

was not present at the hearing and did not testify how the test
was given and under what conditions.

The test was arranged by

the Union without notice to or participation or observation by
the Company leaving questions of its self-serving nature, if not
credibility, unanswered.The results of the test were in typed
transcript form unsupported by the underlying tape recordings or
testimony of those recordings.

These questionable aspects of

-4the test, viewed in the light of the debatable conclusiveness
of polygraph tests generally and their questionable admissibilit
into evidence, nullifies its evidentiary value in this proceeding.
I do not find that the Company "discriminated" against
the grievant with regard to the recall procedure.

All employees

in this particular recall were recalled in the same manner, by
certified letters.

Only in a few prior recalls did it also or

alternatively, in a few instances, use the telephone.

I do not

find those few cases to constitute a practice contrary to the
use of certified mail, and especially not in the instant case
when all the recall notices were by certified mail as mandated
by Article 6.03 d of the contract.
Finally, under the particular circumstances of this case
I do not find that Article 6.03 d; requires that the certified
letter phsyically reach the addressee.
letter was sent to the grievant.
at delivery.

Here,

a certified

The post office made efforts

With my finding that the grievant knew of the

letter and its contents, notification as contemplated by Article
6.03 d was satisfied by that knowledge.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article 6.03 d
of the collective bargaining agreement in
connection with the termination of Max D.
Creviston.

DATED: August 11, 1981
STATE OF New York )
.
COUNTY OF New York )

_________„__„_
Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this llth day of August, 1981 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Plainedge Federation of Teachers

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1739 0037 81

and
Plainedge Union Free School District

The stipulated issue is:
Did the District violate Article XI of
the collective bargaining agreement in
assigning teachers of special subjects
at the Eastplain School to duties of
attending to student arrivals and performing after school bus duties?
A hearing was held at the District offices in Hicksville,
New York on July 30, 1981 at which time representatives of the
above named Union and District appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union claims that the assignment of the disputed "bus
duty" was a "new rule...and policy" which "substantially affect
the wages, hours or terms of conditions of employment of the
teaching staff" within the meaning of Article XI of the contract
and hence may not be unilaterally promulgated or implemented by
the District.

Additionally the Union contends that the assign-

ment of the disputed work just to teachers of special subjects
and not to classroom teachers is discriminatory as to the former
and hence prohibited.
The Union's two contentions are rejected.

The collective

bargaining agreement is applicable to all of the schools of the
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District, not just to the Eastplain School.

The evidence shows

that at the other schools covered by the contract teachers are
assigned to and regularly perform "bus duty" on the arrival and
departure of students, as a regular part of their duties and
assignments.

This has gone on for some time without objection

from or protest by the Union.

Hence, based on practice as well

as on substantive safety considerations, this type of work is
and has been among "duties properly assigned" within the meaning
of Part II Section 1 of the collective bargaining agreement.
Additionally the assignment falls within the regular working
hours and regular work day of the teachers involved and hence
does not have a substantially new affect on the wages and hours
of the employees involved.

And because both by practice and

substantively it is a "proper assignment",

it is not a new rule

or policy that substantially affects conditions of employment.
The issue narrows to whether the District acted discriminatorily by assigning the work to just the teachers of special
subjects and did not rotate the assignment amongst all the
teachers including classroom teachers.

Though the record shows

that at the other schools in the District this type of bu s duties
is assigned to all members of the faculty on a rotating basis,
the evidence also shows that certain duties such as supervision
of the cafeteria, is performed at other schools by classroom
teachers but not teachers of special studies.

The Union does

not claim that this latter circumstance discriminates against
the classroom teachers.

It seems to me that if teachers of

I
special studies can be excused from

cafeteria duty it is not

discriminatory to require them to perform bus duty at the Eastplain School without the participation in that assignment of

-3classroom teachers.

I am satisfied that the District makes

these types of work assignments depending on the availability
of time and personnel.

Whereas much of the work involving the

supervision of study halls, corridors, the cafeteria and the
arrival and departure of buses is parceled out to all teachers
on a rotational basis, I do not find it discriminatory, within
the traditional meaning of that word, for certain of these dutie
to be assigned only some of the teachers as in the case of
cafeteria duty at many of the schools and bus duty at the
Eastplain School. In the instant case the District has shown
that the teachers of special studies at the Eastplain School
had the available time within their regular work day to take on
this assignment, which for each teacher when so assigned amountec
to approximately ten minutes a day.
Accordingly the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having heard the proofs and allegations of the
above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The District did not violate Article XI
of the collective bargaining agreement
in assigning teachers of special studies
at the Eastplain School to the duties of
attending student arrivals and performing
after school bus duties.

DATED: August 5, 1981
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this fifth day of August, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Roosevelt Teachers Association

AWARD
„
»1-7 on m o o 01
Case
#1739-0122-81

and
Roosevelt U.F.S.D.

The stipulated issue is:
Did the District violate the contractual
salary schedule in its implementation
thereof during the 1980-1981 school year?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the District's offices on June 17,
1981 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's
Oath was waived.
I do not find any contractual obligation or promise on
the part of the District to "expend," in its implementation of
the negotiated salary and increment increases,the total amount
of money which the District told the Union said increases would
cost. Rather the parties negotiated for and agreed on certain
benefits, namely a specified percentage wage increase and incremental movements for those eligible, That the cost calculated
and discussed at negotiations could and probably would change
between then and the. time of implementation of the new contract,
due to layoffs, replacements, and other cost saving methods was
well within the expectations and contemplation of the parties,
Had the Union intended that the District be bound to spend
or "expend" the total amounts of the then projected costs, the
Memorandum of Understanding and/or the contract should have
explicitly so provided.

They do not.

Instead, what is called for and required is a 6 per cent
salary increase and increment step-ups equivalent, on the average
to an additional 3 per cent. Those percentages, as is customary,
and in the absence of specific provisions otherwise, are based on

-2the payrolls in existence at the time of implementation.

The

District has complied with that requirement and I find no
contractual provision requiring a different method of calculation
or implementation. In the absence of any such special requirement, and in the absence of any specific contract language on
how and to whom the increments were to apply, I cannot find that
the District erred in not moving all employees at Step 15 to Step
20.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following expedited
AWARD:
The District did not violate the
contractual salary schedule in its
implementation thereof during the
1980-1981 school year.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 18, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )SS''
On this 18th day of June, 1981 before me, personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 15135

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #80K/28657

and
Sherwood Medical Industries

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the disciplinary
suspensions of a total of eight days and
two five hour Saturday shifts of Phoebe
Gannon? If not what shall be the remedy?
However, for initial determination is whether a reprimand
given Ms. Gannon prior to the aforementioned disciplinary suspension is substantively subsumed within the stipulated issue and
arbitrable

thereunder.

A hearing was held in Glen Falls, New York on June 4, 1981
at which time Ms. Gannon, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

Both sides filed post-hearing brief;

The grievant's suspensions referred to in the stipulated
issue were imposed on June 27 and August 15, 1980 respectively.
It is undisputed that the Company and the Union agreed to merge
the two grievances which arose therefrom into the issue for determination in this arbitration.
Previously, on June 13, 1980, the grievant received a
reprimand.

The Union contends that that reprimand is a part of
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the "progressive discipline" leading to and culminating in the
two suspensions; that the propriety of the suspensions rest in
part at least, on the prior reprimand, and that all three disciplinary penalties must therefore be adjudicated on their merits;
and that at the grievance meetings on the suspensions, the Union
proposed and the Company agreed to include the reprimand as part
of the issue in this arbitration.
The Company denies that there was any agreement to include
the reprimand on its merits as part of the suspension grievances
or as part of this arbitration.

It asserts that the Union grieved

the reprimand separately from the subsequent suspensions; that
the reprimand grievance went through the steps of the grievance
procedure, but was not filed for arbitration thereafter.

The

Company argues that the reprimand grievance is no longer arbitrable because it was not submitted to arbitration as required by
Article 6 Sections 6.07 and 6.08 of the contract0

Those sections

require that the "appeal to arbitration" be"by written notice
from the Union International Staff Representative and given to
the Industrial Relations Manager within thirty (30) calendar days
after receipt of the Company's written answer in Step 3."
The relevant portions of Section 6.08 provide that
"if the employee or the Union fails
to follow the foregoing grievance
procedure in accordance with the...
time limits and conditions contained
therein, the grievance shall be deemed settled on the basis of the Company's
last answer, and shall not be subject
to further appeal or review."
There is no question that the Union did not formally appeal

-3the reprimand grievance to arbitration in accordance with the
precise time limits and procedures set forth above.
The Union's position on the arbitrability of the reprimand
grievance is understandable, logical and reasonable.

However it

is not in accord with the bilaterally negotiated provisions of
the contract, nor is it supported by sufficient probative evidence
to establish a bilaterally agreed to variation of the contract.
And it is to the contract and the evidence that the arbitrator is
bound.
The reprimand preceded the first suspension by only a few
days.

It was and is part of the "progressive discipline" formula

applied to the grievant by the Company.

The subsequent, more

severe penalties of three and five day suspensions were founded
both procedurally and substantively on the previous discipline,
including the first - the reprimand.

As all three grievances

involved the same employee, were close in time, and as such could
be construed as arising from the same or closely related circumstances, I can understand, logically, how the Union deemed that
all three should go to arbitration together, and why it tried and
probably believed that an agreement to do so was reached with the
Company.
However the contract requires that each grievance be
processed through a prescribed procedure and submitted to arbitration within prescribed time limits.

The reprimand was the subject

of a separate grievance which, independent of the subsequent
suspensions, was processed through the grievance procedure.

It

-4was answered separately by the Company at the last step of the
grievance procedure.

The contract requires that at that point

it be appealed to arbitration.

If not, it loses its arbitra-

bility.
The reprimand grievance was not made part of the written
suspension grievances in and through the grievance steps of the
latter two.

So procedurally the Union did not join or even

attempt to formally join all three grievances at that level.
Apparently it included the reprimand grievance for the first time
as a written part of the suspension grievances when it filed the
latter for arbitration with the Federal Mediation and Conciliatiot
Service.

In response the Company wrote the Union stating that

in its view the reprimand grievance was no longer arbitrable.
Hence I find no written agreement, or mutually agreed to
amendment of the suspension grievances which included the reprimand for arbitration.

In that respect therefore, the strict

provisions of the grievance and arbitration procedures of the
contract were not met by the Union with regard to the arbitrability of the reprimand issue.
That leaves the question of whether there was a binding
oral agreement between the Union and the Company at the grievance
meeting(s) on the suspension issues to include the earlier reprimand in a single subsequent arbitration.

As I stated earlier,

I can understand how, under these particular circumstances the
Union tried and even thought that such an agreement had been
reached.

No doubt at that time it seemed expeditious, economical

and logical to proceed to arbitration that way.

But the evidence
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in this record falls short of proving that any such agreement
was reached.

The Company denies it vigorously.

There is no

written stipulation or memorandum supportive of the Union's
claim.

The testimony of those at the meeting(s) is offsetting,

indeterminative and hence inconclusive either way.

On this

question the burden is on the Union to show a verbal variation
of the contract.

The evidence adduced by the Union does not meet

that test.
Based on the foregoing, I must conclude that the reprimand
grievance was and remained separate and apart from the suspension
grievances;

that under the contract requirements it should have

been but was not appealed to arbitration as prescribed; and that
there is insufficient evidence to prove a contrary agreement
between the Union and the Company.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of ttye
above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The reprimand grievance of Phoebe Gannon
is not arbitrable.
Briefs on the merits of the suspension
grievances of Phoebe Gannon shall be
submitted to the Undersigned postmarked
no later than September 15, 1981.

DATED: August 13, 1981
STATE OF New York )gg
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this 13th day of August, 1981, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 15135

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #80K/28657

and
Sherwood Medical Industries

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the three day
suspension and the five day suspension
of Phoebe Gannon? If not what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on June 4, 1981 at which time Ms. Gannon,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

Both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was suspended for three working days for im-

properly failing to perform a certain re-work assignment after
being instructed to do so by supervision.

She was subsequently

suspended for five working days for turning out work with a high
level of defects.
The facts surrounding the three day suspension involve an
evidentiary issues on which I shall give the grievant the benefit
of the doubt.

She denies that she was told or understood that

she was to perform the re-work assignment.

The Company's testimony,

from supervision is that the assignment was unquestionably given
to her.

Though I think there is little doubt that she was

-2instructed to perform the re-work, I conclude it to be plausible
and hence believable that she did not hear or comprehend that
assignment.

Some time earlier she had received a written warning.

Against the backdrop of that warning I do not think she would
have willfully

ignored or refused to carry out instructions from

supervision had she heard or comprehended those instructions.
With the testimony on this critical point offsetting, I am prepared to hold that she may not have heard, paid attention to or
understood what was expected of her in connection with the rework, and that the Company's evidence falls short of meeting the
requisite burden of proof.

Therefore I shall reverse that

disciplinary suspension.
However, the facts surrounding the subsequent five day
suspension are different.

There is no dispute that the grievant'b

work was about 7570 defective.

The only question is whether the

machine and/or other working conditions were such as to excuse
this extremely high percentage of poor quality.
the negative.

I conclude in

I reject as unproved, the Union's claim that the

grievant was "harrassed" by her foreman.

I find neither the

machine nor the working conditions to be the fault because the
unrefuted evidence shows that other operators, on the same machin
and working under the same conditions on shifts before and following the

grievant, performed the work and produced the product

involved without any significant amount of defects.

Hence I

conclude that the grievant's defective work was solely a result
of her inability or failure to perform her duties satisfactorily.
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As it is well settled that an employee's inability to
perform work assignments satisfactorily is grounds for disciplinary action, the Company had cause to discipline the grievant.
Although the five day suspension was based, in part, on the
principle of progressive discipline and is founded not only on
the warning (which I found in an earlier decision to be timebarred from arbitration) but also on the immediately proceeding
three day suspension (which I have reversed herein), I do not
find that a five day suspension, following the aforementioned
warning is either unwarranted or excessive even with the reversal of the proceeding three day suspenion.

Accordingly the five

day suspension is upheld.
The Undersigned^ duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
(1) The three day suspension of Phoebe
Gannon is reversed. She shall be made
whole for the time lost.
(2) The five day suspension of Phoebe
Gannon was for just: cause and is upheld,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 11, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) "
On this llth day of November, 1981 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J.;Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the forgoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same«

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Company

This case involves the grievances of Althea Decker, Mary
Ann Marshall and Barbara Wegrzyn, hereinafter referred to as the
grievants.

They and the Union on their behalf claim that they

were improperly denied promotions to the job Coin Telephone
Consultant, and that junior employees were appointed instead, in
violation of the contract.
A hearing was held on March 26, 1981 in Miami, Florida at
which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument anc
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Each side filed a post-

hearing brief together with certain arbitration decisions on
which they rely as binding or as persuasive precedent.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The pertinent contract provisions are:
Article 12
Section 12.02C: In the selection of
employees within the bargaining unit
for promotions within the bargaining
unit, seniority shall govern if other
necessary qualifications of the individuals are substantially equal.
Section 12.04 Appeal Rights: The
determination of the Company on any of
the factors in 12.03 and 13.06 shall be
subject to the grievance procedure set
forth in Article 21, and after the exhaustion of such procedure a charge of

The

-2Arbitrary action or bad faith shall
be subject to the arbitration procedure set forth in Article 23.
If the arbitrator finds that the
Company did act arbitrarily or in
bad faith, the Company will promptly
take the necessary steps to correct
such action.
The parties were unable to stipulate a precise issue for
determination.

The Union stated the issue as:

"Was the selection procedure in
which the grievants were denied
promotion to the position of
Coin Telephone Consultants tainted
by arbitrary action?"
The Company states the issue as:
"Did the Company act arbitrarily
when it selected someone other
than the three named grievants
for the positions of Coin Telephone Consultants?"
I do not find any substantive difference in the respective issues proffered by the parties.

The question as I see it

is whether the Company's action in evaluating the grievants,
in denying them the promotions and in selecting persons less
senior to fill those jobs, was arbitrary.
There is no claim by the Union of "bad faith" within the
meaning of Section 12.04 of the contract.

Also the parties

have stipulated that the Arbitrator is not to fashion a remedy
in the event he finds arbitrariness in the Company's decision.
Hence the question is simply whether the Company's decision was
arbitrary or not.
The meaning of "arbitrary" is well settled generally by
arbitral decisions as well as by cited prior cases between the

-3parties.

A Company decision which is unsupported by any logical

rational or principled reason is arbitrary.

A decision which

fails to take into consideration all material information and
which, as a consequence, is adverse to the affected employee,
is arbitrary.

A quality differentiation between and amongst

employees which is unsupported by facts or evidence warranting
that differentiation, is arbitrary.
Also, where employees as here are judged on the basis of
certain specified factors, an arbitrary determination with regard to one, several or all of the factors would be prejudicial
to the overall evaluation and hence would tincture that evaluation with arbitrariness.

In other words, if the Company acted

arbitrary in connection with one or more of the factors, it
would be my determination that the selection process in toto
was arbitrary.

This is to be distinguished from the Company's

assertion that arbitrariness must be found as an overall judgment of the affected employees qualifications rather than a
piecemeal assessment, factor by factor.

In my view my deter-

mination that no factor may be judged arbitrary in order for
the total evaluation to be sustained is supported by Section
12.04 of the contract.

That Section, as set forth above, per-

mits the Union to grieve the Company's determination "on any
of the factors..."(emphasis added).

If the overall judgment

was determinative rather than a factor-by-factor analysis, the
Union's right to appeal determinations of any factor would be
meaningless.
Also it is well settled that when an arbitrator is

-4determining the question of arbitrariness, he may not substitute
his judgment for that of the employer if he merely concludes
that on the merits he would have reached a different conclusion.
An honest disagreement on the merits must be decided in favor
of the employer.

Only where the employer's decision is devoid of

a rational or principled basis and where there is no evidentiary
reason or justification for that decision, may it be overturned
as arbitrary.
Facts and Contentions
On or about January 10, 1979, there was posted a notice
of a job vacancy in the Miami Exchange for the job title "Coin
Telephone Consultant."
positions to be filled.

It indicated

there were two to six

All employees could "bid" for the job.

The closing date for bids was January 28, 1979 and it was expected that the vacancies would be filled within 60 days of the posting.

There were 234 bids for the positions.

Three vacancies

were filled and the selectees were Haley, Moore and LaFleur whose
dates of seniority were May 15, 1960, September 26, 1960 and
October 6, 1960 respectively, all junior to the grievants.
Mr. DeCaso, the individual to whom the duty of selection
was assigned and who acted as the "selector," testified about
his background with the Company and how he went about selecting
the employees to fill the vacancies.

The training which a

selector undergoes and the procedure prescribed for selection
was described in some detail by Mr. Choate who was charged with
training selectors.

The job of "selector" has been a full-time

position since 1965 when the current plan was adopted„

The plan

-5implements the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
and includes "a performance appraisal, a performance evaluation
plan, and a personnel selection guide, two items which have remained essentially unchanged except for minor revisions since
1965."
The Personnel Selection Guide is a "guide for selecting
employees for promotion within the bargaining unit" but the
selector has the responsibility for making the final decision
concerning the selection.

However, the guide provides "that

the selection method should be in general conformity with the
principles expressed in (the) guide."

The guide identifies five

factors or qualifications to be considered with respect to
individuals who bid for the vacancy.
Production Expectancy in Proposed Job
Training Required in Proposed Job
Attendance Expectancy in Proposed Job
Punctuality Expectancy in Proposed Job
Job Conduct-Behavior Expectancy in
Proposed Job
The guide mandates the selector to "gather and consider
all reasonably available and meaningful information on each
candidate relative to the factors."
The selector must render a judgment on each of the five
factors as part of the implementation of the "substantially
equal" provision of the collective bargaining agreement quoted
above.

The object is to discern substantial differences in

overall qualifications, if any, among the candidates.

A sub-

stantial difference, according to the guide, "though not definable in precise terms, means a difference which is not so slight

-6as to cause doubt or leave room for reasonable question."

The

guide also stresses that "the appropriateness of the selection
of an individual remains dependent upon whether that individual
can be shown to be substantially better qualified than any unsuccessful bidder, such judgments or ratings (concerning the
factors) notwithstanding."

The judgments or ratings "are not

in themselves a proper basis for making selections."
"Production-expectancy," "generally speaking" usually is
deserving of greater weight than the other information.

How-

ever, a rigid statement of relative importance of the factors
is eschewed in favor of emphasizing the need to make the ultimat
judgment on the basis of over-all qualifications.
The guide describes the characteristics to be considered
with respect to each of the five factors and establishes a
rating system for each.
Mr. DeCaso described his selection process as beginning
with the requisition of the personnel records of the bidders
from the respective Company departments.
described as a "background

He conducted what he

investigation" of the job vacancy

after reading and familiarizing himself with the selection
guide, the description of the vacant positions in the so-called
"Agreement Interpretation" and the "description of the job as
it appears in the promotion and transfer plan."

He went "out

and personally (saw) the job himself" and spoke to the manager
in coin telephone.

He also spoke to some supervisors and coin

telephone consultants

in order to obtain a picture of the day

to day duties of the Coin Telephone Consultant.

He did not

-7interview any of the applicants, but he did review their
requisitioned personnel records and interviewed their supervisors .
Based on the foregoing, DeCaso reached the following
conclusion:

Selectees
C. Haley
G. Moore
N. LaFleur
Grievants
A. Decker
M. Marshall
B. Wegrzyn
*

Prod.
Exp.

0*
0
0

Trng.
Req'd.
Ma j or**
Major
Major

s*
s
s

All**
All
All

Attn.
Exp.
S
S
S

S
F j-*

s

Punc.

s
s
s

Conduct
S
S
S

s

S

F
S

s
s

0 = outstanding; S = satisfactory; F = fair

** Indicates degree of training required and is described in
greater detail herein.
Production expectancy rates "one degree of success which
can logically be expected of the candidate in the productive
aspects of the job, with normal training."

There are three

possible ratings:
"Outstanding" means "expected to be among the distinctly
superior employees in that job as to quality and quantity of
work."
"Satisfactory" means there is "no substantial basis on
which "outstanding" expectancy could be supported; nor on which
a "fair" one could be justified."
"Fair" means "expected to be marginal performer.

Sub-

stantial deficiencies exist relative to production potential."
The vacant position of Coin Telephone Consultant is
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described as follows in the Agreement interpretation:
COIN TELEPHONE CONSULTANT - (4/1/78) Negotiates
with business customers, or their designated representatives , for the placement, removal, relocation, change or maintenance of coin telephone
service and equipment. Makes field visits to
premises to evaluate profit potential of general
location, including interview with customer.
Selects specific site for coin telephone enclosure and makes field sketch for subsequent preparation of service order and documentation
records. Prepares service order memo, location
diagram and other related records. Analyzes
market coverage provided by existing coin accounts
to evaluate profitability and recommends appropriate action, either corrective or original.
Handles a variety of customer inquiries regarding coin telephone matters, including but not
limited to commissions, deposits, burglaries,
etc. Analyzes technical data from outputs
originated from mechanized coin programs. Provides input data relative to mechanized coin
programs. Provides interdepartmental liason as
required. Drives a Company vehicle.
A key feature of the position is the face-to-face customer
contacts for the purpose of making sales.
DeCaSO testified that he had rated the three selectees
"outstanding" for the Coin Telephone Consultant position based
on their previous backgrounds and the information in their
personnel records.

Each had served for a period of 11 to 12

years as service representatives which required handling a
variety of customer inquiries on the telephone and selling while
on the telephone.

The position, according to DeCaso required a

certain degree of decision making, experiencing pressure because
of constant telephone contact with customer and familiarity
with the Universal Service Order Code Book (USOC)0
all transferrable skills.

These were

Haley had been a business office

supervisor for three years which required leadership, analytic
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and other qualities.

LaFleur had been a service representative

in a coin telephone group from 1975-79 and worked with coin
telephone consultants on a daily basis.
Haley had been rated "more than satisfactory" in quality
of work on 2 of 3 prior ratings.

There was insufficient oppor-

tunity to observe quality for the other evaluations.

She

received three satisfactory ratings for quality of work.
Moore had one rating of "more than satisfactory" in
quality and "satisfactory" in quantity and another of "more
than satisfactory" in quantity and "satisfactory" in quality.
LaFleur was rated "more than satisfactory" on both counts in
two evaluations.

By his grade of "outstanding," DeCaso

testified he expected each of the selectees to be outstanding
in both quantity and quality.
The three grievants received "satisfactory" with respect
to the bid position on the following basis:
According to DeCaso, Decker and Marshall had received
"satisfactory" ratings on quality and quantity.,

He did not

testify on direct concerning Wegrzyn's ratings, but Union
Exhibit 7, the performance evaluation for October 25, 1978,
shows she was rated "more than satisfactory" in quality and
"satisfactory" in quantity.
Decker and Wegrzyn were customer instructors and Marshall
a service assistant.

DeCaso concluded these did not involve

readily transferrable skills.

He believed that Decker's posi-

tion of service representative for one year in 1961 was not
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material because the job probably had changed a great deal in
the intervening 17 years.
DeCaso concluded that the basic differences between a
coin telephone consultant and a service representative was that
the former dealt face-to-face with the customer while the
latter dealt with the customer over the telephone.

The basic

similarities and transferrable skills or experience involved
selling, basic knowledge of how to deal with customers and
working in a high pressure environment.
The Union points out that customer instructor, the positions held by two of the grievants involved on-premises faceto-face dealing with customers.

They also were required to hav

insights as to likely customers for additional sales by virtue
of their analysis of the customer's requirements.
DeCaso rated the selectees as "major" with respect to
training needs and the grievants were rated "all."
est is "minor."

The high-

"Major" means the individual would "need a

substantial portion of the formal and/or on-the-job training
prior to being given a full productive assignment."

"All"

means the individual "would need all, or practically all of,
the formal and/or on-the-job training and would be completely
ineffective if immediately placed on the assignment."
The training required for coin telephone consultant is
eight days of formal training with regard to sales, fact-findin
negotiations, sketching premises and USOC.

The selectees were

rated "Major" because of the 6-8 weeks of formal training in

-11sales, dealing with customers, and USOC and other matters
they had undergone as service representatives.

DeCaso con-

cluded that neither the formal training nor the experience
of the three grievants bore sufficient relationship to the
coin telephone position as to avoid the necessity for all of
the formal and practically all of the informal training required
for that position.

The selectees would require all the forma].

training and major informal or on-the-job training.
DeCaso stated that the main difference in the training
of the customer instructor and that of the coin telephone
representatives was that the latter dealt with sales and
persuasiveness while the former instructed as to use.

Howevei

he seemed unaware of the length of training received by two
of the grievants and had no detailed knowledge of the kind of
training they had received.

Wegrzyn testified she had

received 13 weeks of initial formal training and Decker had
had 4 weeks of training. Although the Wegrzyn personnel record
used by DeCaso did not contain this fact, there was no contrary evidence.

And the record he received by the Company

began at a point subsequent to the time she claimed she had
received the training.

It also appears that the training

record he received dealt with non-Miami based training and
did not include the Miami based training.

Wegrzyn had been

loaned to the United Way and receiving Company wages to engage in telephone solicitations„

Consequently, there were

several Company sponsored programs which DeCaso did not
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consider for one or more of the grievants simply because they
did not appear on the record provided him by the Company.
He also did not take into account their off-duty experience o

Marshall had a series of leadership and advanced leader-

ship programs in her capacity as a Union Steward and then union
representative.

The latter at the University of Georgia.

Among

her duties are the "selling" of the union to new members and
service as a lobbyist at Tallahassee.

She also successfully

completed a Company sponsored management course.

It does not

appear that these were in the record examined by the selector.
With respect to these off-duty experiences DeCaso did not
ask for the records in which they might have appeared if recorded.

He considered outside activities as something to be brought

to his attention by the bidder and not to go out of his way to
learn of those activities.
Also the Union contends that the Company had engaged in
several instances of "arbitrary action" when the selector failed
to follow either the letter or the spirit of the Personnel
Selection Guide and thereby committed a contractually proscribed
"arbitrary action."

In particular, it claims that the rating

of Haley and Moore as "outstanding" on productivity expectancy
was "clearly erroneous" and that all three grievants ratings of
"all" on the training factor was clearly erroneous underrating.
The Union also claims that either or both of Marshall's and
Haley's ratings on the "attendance expectancy" factor was
arbitrary.
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The Company claims that in substance the Union is merely
attacking the selector's judgment on each of the factors and
with respect to his overall judgment in selecting the three
selectees.

It argues that to honor the Union's claim would

be to arbitrate the issue of relative qualifications of the
candidates which is beyond the arbitrator's authority.

OPINION
Based on the record I can find no evidentiary, principled
or supported basis for the selector's determination that Haley
and Moore be rated "outstanding" in Production Expectancy.
Neither received "more than satisfactory" ratings on both
quantity and quality of their prior work.

Hence, on this basis

alone it would not be reasonable to conclude they would be
"among the distinctly superior employees in (the position of
coin telephone consultant) as to quality and quantity of work."
The fact they had

performed the task of service representative

which provides some experience for the new position, and had
performed at a "more than satisfactory" level on both counts
provides no additional basis for an "outstanding" rating.
"Outstanding" is a prediction. With no such rating in the past
and in the absence of any special basis of quality or uniquenes
in their qualifications for the new job there is no logical
basis to predict or conclude they would be "outstanding." Indeed, according to DeCaso, the new and distinctive element in th
promotion is face-to-face customer encounters, and their prior
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record does not include this experience.
As to training expectancy, no evidentiary, principled
or supported basis is provided in the record for concluding
that the grievants require "all training" and the selectees
only "major" training.

The former have had extensive

and experience in face-to-face on premises customer

training

contact.

The latter in telephone sales, but not face-to-face customer
contact.

Both qualities are required for the position of coin

telephone consultant and no reason appears to suggest that the
prior face-to-face training and experience will result in requiring more training for sales than the converse would be for
the selectees.
In short some of the facts adduced at the hearing concern
ing the grievants prior training was not received or otherwise
considered by the Selector and those facts are relevant to a
full and fair selection.

Many of these facts should properly

have been in the grievants' personnel file and the grievants
had a right to assume that that information was transmitted to
the selector. Indeed, the record of Wegrzyn described above,
and limited in span of time, precluded consideration of some
of the very experience which, because of that grievant's
seniority and experience, would work in her favor.
In addition, if interviews are not to be held, the employee should at least be able to rely on complete Company
records concerning Company sponsored training being made available to the selector or

the selector at least making inquiry

-15-

of district supervisors who would have information about
relevant activities.
There is another difficulty with the ratings on training.
The Personnel Selection Guide defines the rating "all", as
follows:
"Would need all, or practically all, of
the formal and/or on-the-job training.
Would be completely ineffective if immediately placed on productive assignment."
DeCaso concluded that all of the selectees and the
grievants would require all of the formal training.

Literally

this means that all six would be rated "all" under the first
sentence.

This is the Company's regulation and it should be

held to the standards it promulgated.

While I might have my

personal doubts that any of the individuals "would be completel
ineffective if immediately placed on productive assignment,"
the language of the standard seems to suggest that if they need
all of the formal training they would be "completely ineffective" under its terms.

On this basis, as well as the others

discussed above, there is no principled basis in the record for
his distinguishing between the selectees and the grievants with
respect to training.
I do not hold that a failure to interview, as such,,is
an arbitrary action.

The Personnel Selection Guide recommends

its use as one of a number of tools0
is a judgment call.

Whether it should be used

However, interviews in this case might

well have revealed the information Company records should, but
did not contain.

Further, the limited notice to bidders that
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they can submit additional information themselves is, in my
view, insufficiently highlighted, and misplaces the burden.
For if there is no interview, the selector should make some
effort to obtain additional information, which he failed to
do in this case.

His failure to do so, the apparently incomplete

records in this case plus the failure to interview constitute
a failure to meet the mandate that "the selector should gather
and consider all reasonably available and meaningful
tion on each candidate relative to the factors."

informa-

If he is not

going to interview, more than the effort reflected in this
record is required.

It is no excuse that many had bid and that

he was trying to fill the jobs within 60 days.

Neither the

grievants nor any other bidders should suffer the consequence
of a selector's perception that he would be overburdened if he
was thorough.

Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Based on my findings with regard to
the factors noted, together with the
failure of the Company to consider
relevant information, the Company's
action in denying the grievants, Althea
Decker, Mary Ann Marshall and Barbara
Wegrzyn promotions to the job Coin Telephone Consultant was arbitrary and hence
in violation of Article 12 of the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: October 8, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 8th day of October, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Printing Specialties' and Paper
Products' Union No. 594,
Chapel No. 1

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 60K/10430

and
The Standard Register Company

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the
grievance of Darrell Lewis dated
January 8, 1980?
A hearing was held in York, Pennsylvania on March 18, 1981
at which time Mr. Lewis, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant'
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A steno-

graphic record was taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs
The grievant was laid off from the pressman job due to a
decrease in available work, and based on his seniority was requirec
to bump into the job of press trainee.

The Union claims that he

should have been transferred to or allowed to bump into the job
of PCM press operator, where employees with less seniority remained at work.

Alternatively the Union contends that the layoff

should not have been made within the pressman classification but
rather from within "related classifications" including the PCM
job, where employees junior to the grievant were at work.

There-

after, asserts the Union, the Company should have rearranged the
remaining personnel to cover the available work.

This procedure

argues the Union, would have resulted in the layoff of an

-2-

employee junior to the grievant and preserved the grievant's
employment status as a pressman.
Neither position by the Union is contractually tenable.
By title, pay rate, the history of its bilaterally negotiated
establishment and by practice, the job of PCM press operator is
in a different classification from that of pressman.

Hence a

layoff declared in the pressman classification is not a layoff
within the PCM classification, and employees in both separate
classifications are not contractually grouped together for
purposes of layoff.

Consequently the grievant's layoff within

the pressman classification was consistent with the provisions
in Article IV of the contract for "layoffs by seniority lists
within such job classification" even though less senior employees
were retained in the different PCM classification.
Also, as the PCM press operator classification carries a
higher rate of pay because of its greater complexities and
responsibilities, a bump or movement from pressman to PCM operator would be not only a movement from one classification to a
different classification, but "upward" from a lower to a higher
rated job.
The question narrows to whether, as the Union claims, that
upward bump or movement should have been allowed in the instant
case.

I do not find that the layoff procedures under Article IV

Section 4 of the contract, contemplate or allow for an upward
bump or transfer from a lower rated to a higher rated job whether
the layoff be temporary or permanent.

Article IV Section 4G

explicitly provides that in the case of a permanent layoff "the
lowest seniority employee shall move down to a lower rated job

-3classification...." (emphasis added).

Therefore if the instant

layoff was "permanent," the Union's claim that the grievant
should have been allowed to bump upward must be denied, without
any need to consider whether a bump can be achieved between two
different job classifications.

The same is true, albeit impliedly,

with regard to a "temporary" layoff.

Under the temporary layoff

provisions of the contract, specifically Article IV Section 4A5,
pay adjustments are accorded an employee who is "bumped back to
a lower paying classification, due to layoff in his classification...."

This provision follows the work sharing arrangements

which may precede reductions in the work force, and means to my
mind, that when layoffs finally occur the bumping rights of employees laid off within their classification are limited to lower
rated jobs or at least do not include the right to move or bump
upward.

Again, therefore, because an upward bump is precluded,

what the grievant seeks must be denied without any need to determine whether under other circumstances a bump from one classification to another would be allowed.

And it is also unnecessary to

determine whether the instant layoff was contractually "temporary1
or "permanent."
Also, it is well recognized that bumping rights are generally
limited to movement laterally or downward unless there is some
express contractual authority for bumps to higher rated and higher
paid positions.

I find no such special provision or arrangement

in the instant contract and hence I conclude that any such right
is a matter for subsequent collective bargaining and not
arbitration.
The Union's alternative argument, namely that the layoff

-4should have been declared not within the pressman classification
but within "related classifications" where less senior employees
were at work, is not determinable in this arbitration.

The fact

is that under the contract the decision of whether the layoff is
to take place within a classification or within related job
classifications is made by the Joint Standing Committee.

There

is no evidence in the record that that was not done here and
there md is no challenge by the Union in this case to that
action or decision by the Joint Standing Committee.

In other

words, absent evidence to the contrary I must conclude that the
Joint Standing Committee decided this layoff would occur within
the job classification of pressman and not within related
classifications.

The Joint Standing Committee is authorized to

decide one way or the other.

That determination, not challenged

at the time that it was made, and not challenged in the course
of this arbitration hearing, cannot be impeached by simple
argument.

Therefore the Union's alternative argument herein

lacks evidentiary standing and must be rejected.
For the foregoing reasons the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of Darrell Lewis dated
January 8, 1980 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 7, 1981

LABOR COST REVIEW PANEL

Greater New York Health Care
Facilities Association, Inc.;
on behalf of its Members
Petitioner

AWARD

and
The State of New York

The Undersigned members of the Labor Cost Review Panel having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, and
having met and deliberated in executive session, make the following
AWARD:
Subject to final decision on the
pending alleged "windfall and hardship" cases the State shall forthwith implement and grant to the
Members of the petitioner the 1980
mid-year trend factor adjustment in
the same manner and to the same extent
it would have been implemented and
granted had it not been withheld.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Bartholomew J. Lawson
Concurring

William J. Gormley
Dissenting
DATED: February 9, 1981
STATE OF New York

)

COUNTY OF New York )SS-:
On this 9th day of February, 1981, before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
DATED: February 9, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

On this 9th day of February, 1981, before me personally came and
appeared Bartholomew J. Lawson to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
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DATED: February
1981
STATE OF New York )CO •
COUNTY OF
)
On this
day of February, 1981, before me personally came and
appeared William J. Gormley to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

LABOR COST REVIEW PANEL

Greater New York Health Care
Facilites Association, Inc.;
on behalf of its Members
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Petitioner

and
The State of New York
The issue is whether the State wrongly failed to implement the 1980
mid-year trend factor adjustment applicable to the relevant portions of the
medicaid reimbursement rates for the Members of the Greater New York Health
Care Facilities Association, Inc.
Hearings were duly held and the members of the Labor Cost Review
Panel met and deliberated in executive session.
The State contends that the grant of a mid-year trend factor adjustment is discretionary with the Commissioner of Health and that he need not do
so if no significant financial burden results to the Homes and facilities
affected. Additionally the State asserts that a ruling on this question
should await final determinations of the alleged "windfall" cases now pending
before the Panel.
The State's reference to the aforementioned discretionary authority
is accurately cited, but under present circumstances it is misplaced in these
proceedings before this Panel. The fact is that under its jurisdiction and
considering the nature of its prior interim award(s) the Panel is the preeminent authority on the financial status of the Homes and facilities before
it and it is for the Panel not the State to determine whether the Homes and
facilities petitioned for are affordable or non-affordable. More specifically
the State representatives acknowledge that the mid-year trend factor adjustment
was not granted because
facilities are enjoying
of this Panel, and that
a mid-year trend factor

the State believes that many of the Homes and
"windfall profits" from the prior interim award(s)
under that circumstance the State declines to make
adjustment that would give those Homes and facilities

additional revenue and increased "windfall profits."
By taking that position the State has made a unilateral determination
of affordability when that precise issue is pending for determination by this
Panel. Put another way, the State has usurped the Panel's exclusive jurisdiction over that question under the instant circumstances.

-2The Panel's prior interim award(s) was expressly subject to later
and final determinations of the "windfall and hardship cases." Until those
determinations are made by the Panel the State cannot unilaterally decide
that question. That the State did so by withholding the mid-year trend factor
adjustment for the reasons given is a wrongful exercise of the discretion it
asserts. This is not to say that the State has permanently relinguished that
discretion to this Panel, but rather that at the present time, with the
questions of affordability specifically before the Panel in "windfall" cases
alleged by the State, the State must defer to and await the Panel's decisions
on that question and not pre-judge it. Therefore I consider it inappropriate
for the State to ask that the issue of the mid-year trend factor adjustment
be held in abeyance until the "windfall" cases are decided.
Also, had the mid-year trend factor adjustment been granted as had
been the unvaried practice in each prior year since the State promulgated its
current reimbursement formula, it too would have been subject to final
decisions by the Panel on the alleged "windfall" cases and hence would have
been without financial prejudice.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, and subject to the
final decisions on the affordability or non-affordability of the Homes and
facilities before this Panel, the State shall forthwith implement and grant
to the Homes and facilities which are members of the Greater New York Health
Care Facilities Association and which otherwise would have received that
adjustment, the 1980 mid-year trend factor adjustment in the same manner and
to the same extent that it would have been implemented had it not been withheld.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
February 9, 1981

LABOR COST REVIEW PANEL

Greater New York Health Care
Facilities Association, Inc.;
on behalf of Hillside Manor
Skilled Nursing Facility,
Hillside Manor Health Related
Facility, River Manor Nursing Home,
Kings Terrace Skilled Nursing
Facility, Kings Terrace Health
Related Facility
Petitioner

AWARD

and
The State of New York

The Undersigned members of the Labor Cost Review Panel having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties and having met
and deliberated in executive session make the following AWARD:
1. This Labor Cost Review Panel has jurisdiction to consider and rule on the
petition.
2. The labor cost component of the medicaid
reimbursement rate of each of the above
named Homes and facilities shall be increased in the amount and for the periods
set forth below:
a. For the period April 1, 1979 through
December 31, 1979 the labor cost component
of the medicaid reimbursement rate of
Hillside Manor Skilled Nursing Facility
shall be increased by 29.76 percent.
b. For the period April 1, 1979 through
December 31, 1979 the labor cost component
of the medicaid reimbursement rate of
Hillside Manor Health Related Facility
shall be increased by 10.19 percent.
c. For the period April 1, 1980 through
December 31, 1980 the labor cost component
of the medicaid reimbursement rate of
Hillside Manor Skilled Nursing Facility
shall be increased by 103.52 percent.

-2d. For the period April 1, 1980 through
December 31, 1980 the labor cost component
of the medicaid reimbursement rate of
Hillside Manor Health Related Facility
shall be increased by 46.9 percent.
e. For the period April 1, 1979 through
December 31, 1979 the labor cost component
of the medicaid reimbursement rate of River
Manor Nursing Home shall be increased by
10.12 percent.
f. For the period of April 1, 1980 through
December 31, 1980 the labor cost component
of the medicaid reimbursement rate of River
Manor Nursing Home shall be increased by
42.96 percent.
g. For the period April 1, 1979 through December
31, 1979 the labor cost component of the medicaid reimbursement rate of Kings Terrace
Skilled Nursing Facility shall be increased by
10.92 percent.
h. For the period of April 1, 1979 through December
31, 1979 the labor cost component of the medicaid reimbursement rate of Kings Terrace Health
Related Facility shall be increased by 14.82
percent.
i. For the period April 1, 1980 through December
31, 1980 the labor cost component of the medicaid reimbursement rate of Kings Terrace Skilled
Nursing Facility shall be increased by 78.66
percent.
j. For the period April 1, 1980 through December
31, 1980 the labor cost component of the medicaid reimbursement rate of Kings Terrace Health
Related Facility shall be increased by 70.20
percent.
3. It expressly ordered that the foregoing increases shall
be used by the Homes and facilities only to meet and
pay the labor cost obligations of their collective bargaining agreement with Local 144 SEIU. The Panel retains
jurisdiction for that express purpose as well as for
general implementation of this Award. So that the
Panel's retained jurisdiction may be effective, the
above named Homes and facilities must remain members
in good standing of the Greater New York Health Care
Facilities Association, the petitioner herein, for at
least the entire period of the upcoming Industry-Local
144 collective bargaining agreement, commencing April
1, 1981.
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Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Bartholomew J. Lawson
Concurring

William J. Gormley
Dissenting
DATED: February 9, 1981
STATE OF New York )oc •
COUNTY OF New York )

On this 9th day of February, 1981, before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
DATED: February 9, 1981
STATE OF New York )
ss *
COUNTY OF New York )

On this 9th day of February, 1981, before me personally came and
appeared B. J. Lawson to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
dated: February
1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF
)SS>:
On this
day of February, 1981, before me personally came and
appeared William J. Gormley to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

LABOR COST REVIEW PANEL

Greater New York Health Care Facilities
Association, Inc.; on behalf of Hillside
Manor Skilled Nursing Facility, Hillside
Manor Health Related Facility, River Manor
Nursing Home, Kings Terrace Skilled Nursing
Facility, Kings Terrace Health Related
Facility
Petitioner

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN

and
The State of New York

The issue is whether the above named Homes and facilities are entitled to an upward adjustment in the labor cost component of their medicaid reimbursement rates for the relevant periods in 1979 and 1980 because
of the increased labor costs generated and ordered by the arbitration Awards
of a Board of Arbitration headed by Burton B. Turkus, Esq.
Hearings before this Labor Cost Review Panel were duly held and the
Panel members met and deliberated in executive session.
The State contends that this Labor Cost Review Panel lacks jurisdiction over the issue because the collective bargaining agreements legislated and completed by the Turkus decisions had their origins in the year
1979, whereas the authority of this Panel is over multi-year contracts
entered into between April 1 and December 31, 1978; that the authority of
the Panel is limited to the industry contract between Local 144 SEIU and the
Greater New York Health Care Facilities Association whereas the contract
covering the above Homes and facilities with Local 144 are separate and
independent from the industry contract; and that in any event and alternatively, if the Homes and facilities are deemed "affected" by the IndustryLocal 144 contract, the Panel's authority is limited to the bare dollar
increases of that master agreement as applied to the Homes and facilities
involved herein, and does not extend to the retroactive and cumulative
adjustments between the previous benefit levels and the new benefit levels
resulting from the Turkus decisions.
The State's jurisdictional and restrictive assertion are not tenable.
The contracts concluded by the Turkus decisions had their origins in 1978

and were not newly negotiated in 1979 as a consequence of those decisions.
In some relevant manner the above named Homes and facilities were signatories
to and bound by the strike settlement, thereby accepting a multi-year
contract with Local 144 for a term commencing during the "window period",
April 1, 1978 through December 31, 1978, which included wage adjustments.
Remaining issues were, as was the case with the entire Industry, subject to
later negotiations and arbitration. The Turkus decisions were merely the
culmination of those subsequent negotiations between Local 144 and each Home
and facility. In those negotiations and in the arbitrations Local 144
demanded not only increase and improvements in certain benefits but also
sought to bring the benefit levels of the contracts with these Homes and
facilities to the full substantive level of the Industry contract. This has
been referred to colloquially as "parity."
The State is in error in claiming that the Panel's jurisdiction is
limited to the Industry contract between Local 144 and the Association. The
Regulations expressly grant the Panel authority to deal with increased labor
costs of contracts affected by the Industry agreement. Manifestly the
individual collective bargaining agreements between Local 144 and the above
Homes and facilities, completed as to outstanding terms and conditions by the
Turkus decisions, were affected by the Industry contract. Indeed it was the
Industry contract with which Local 144 sought "parity" in its negotiations
with these Homes and facilities. The Industry contract was the standard the
union sought to achieve. And the Turkus decisions granted that demand by
directing increases in benefits up to and synonymous with the Industry contract.
Hence the resulting contract between Local 144 and these Homes and facilities,
as determined by the strike settlement agreement and as subsequently legislated by the Turkus decisions, were not only profoundly affected by the
Industry agreement but constitute a de facto incorporation of these Homes and
facilities into that Industry contract. Therefore the Panel has jurisdiction
on that statutory basis.
The retroactive, cumulative effect of the Turkus decisions are bona
fide labor costs within the meaning of the Regulation and therefore are
eligible for reimbursement. Increases in actual gross wage rates and wage
retroactivity as well as a bare dollar wage increase are all examples of
labor costs attendant to wages. The same is true for fringe benefits and
other recognized labor costs of the Turkus decisions.
Though I realize that the increases on a cumulative and retroactive
basis are considerable, in bringing these Homes and facilities to "parity"
with the rest of the Industry, the union's demands in that regard and the
Turkus decisions granting those demands are legitimate and bargainable
issues and represent traditional increased labor costs within the jurisdiction
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of this Panel and within the meaning of the Regulations. Hence the full
labor cost increases of the Turkus decisions are eligible for reimbursement.

I
Using basically the same methodology the petitioner and the State
have submitted varied cost calculations into evidence. Based on the entire
record a majority of the Panel have reconciled those differences as set
forth in the Award.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
February

1981

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Office and Professional Employees
International Union, Local 14,
AFL-CIO

AWARD
Case #80K/28916

and
Texaco, Inc.

The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrators and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, make the following AWARD:
The grievance of Cynthia Lee Bobo
is arbitrable.
There was not just cause for the
suspension of Cynthia Lee Bobo.
The suspension is reversed and she
shall be made whole for the time
off.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

G. D. lushewitz
Concurring

P. H. Lister
Dissenting
DATED: August 5, 1981
STATE OF New York ) ss> .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this fifth day of Sugust, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
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DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of August, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared G. D. lushewitz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowled to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of August, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared P. H. Lister to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Office and Professional Employees
International Union, Local 14,
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #80K/28916

Texaco, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the grievance of Cynthia Lee Bobo
is arbitrable?
If so was there just cause for the suspension of Cynthia Lee Bobo and if not what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on May 20, 1981 in Bellmawr, New Jersey
at which time Ms. Bobo, hereinafter referred to as the grievant
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared
Messrs. G. D. lushewitz and P. H. Lister served respectively as
the Union and Company arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration.
The Undersigned served as Chairman.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Company filed a post-hearing brief.
The grievant was suspended on June 9th, 10th and llth, 1980
for leaving the plant during working hours without permission.
The Company claims that the grievance dated June 25, 1980 is untimely under the provisions of Article X Section A of the contrac
Said clause reads:
Discharge, Suspension and Resignation
A. In all cases of complaints arising over
an alleged unjust discharge, suspension or
layoff, a written notice of such complaint
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must be filed with the Company within
ten days after notice to the employe
affected.
The grievant was told she was suspended on June 9th, and
served the balance of the suspension on the subsequent two days.
Obviously she knew of that disciplinary penalty.

The record also

establishes that on June 9th the Company verbally informed the
Union steward of the grievant!s disciplinary suspension.

The

question is whether the grievance dated June 25 met the ten day
time limit under the foregoing contract provision.
I judge the relevant contract language to be ambiguous.

The

phrase "notice to the employe affected" can be interpreted,
logically and reasonably, and within the context of the rest of
Section A, as meaning written.notice.
grievance to be in written form.

Section A requires the

It provides that "a written

notice of such complairt must be filed with the Company within
ten days..." Applying fundamental contract interpretation, the
language immediately following, which repeats the use of the word
"notice" (i.e. "after notice to the employe affected") could well
mean, on the basis of reciprocity and the fact that both notices
are related to each other, that the second notice was also intend
ed to be in writing albeit impliedly. In short, if the grievance
must be by written notice why should not notice of the action of
the discipline to which the grievance is responsible also be in
writing.

Standing alone the word "notice" is unquestionable

satisfied by verbal or constructive notice as well as by written
notice.

But here the word does not stand alone.

It is used twic

In that respect the second use of the word can be construed the
same as first, and that notices in both instances are to be in

-3writing.

Under this interpretation, and in view of the stipu-

lation that the grievant received written notice of her suspension on June 16, 1980 the grievance dated June 25 was within the
prescribed ten days.

Hence the grievance is arbitrable.

On the merits the Company has not proved the grievant's
misconduct by the clear and convincing standard required in
disciplinary cases.

Following a discussion with her supervisor

concerning the quality of her work, the grievant became upset
and said she felt ill.

She claims that she asked for permission

to go home and was granted that permission.

The Company claims

that she asked to go to the dispensary, was granted that right,
but went home instead, (after possibly stopping at the dispensary).

The grievant's testimony and that of her supervisor are

respectively offsetting.

Indeed, considering the unrefuted

evidence that she was so upset by what she viewed as unexpected
and unfounded criticism of her work, and that the circumstance
caused her to cry, it is quite possible that she honestly believe
that she asked to be allowed to go home even though her request
may have been otherwise.

I do not conclude that she willfully

disobeyed instructions or left the plant without believing that
she had permission to do so.
Also, it appears that the grievant's prior disciplinary
record has been clear.

This supports her testimony that the

meeting at which her work was criticized surprised and upset her
and her emotional reaction to the meeting may well have led to an
unintentional misunderstanding.
Accordingly the grievance is granted; the suspension is
reversed and the grievant shall be made whole for the time lost.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Government
Employees, Local No. 2094

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #81K/05111

and
Veterans Administration Medical
Center, New York, New York

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Agency violate the Agreement of
November 8, 1979 and the pertinent government regulations in removing Mrs. JeLain Ringgold Hunter from her employment
as a clerk-typist in the surgical service
of the Medical Center in New York City
effective November 20, 1980? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Agency on November
12, 1981 at which time Mrs. Hunter, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above named Agency and Union
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
This is a discharge case.

The grievant was discharged for

eing absent without authority from September 22 to October 14, 198(j).

L

Previously, in 1978 she was twice suspended for the same offense an<

on September 15, 1980 was reprimanded, againfor being absent without
authority.
The record clearly shows that during the critical period Sepember 22 to October 14, 1980 the grievant failed to comply with the
Agency rules concerning absences.

She did not keep the Agency ade-

quately informed of her absences, and whereabouts, and inaccurately
or misleadingly reported when she would return to work.

-2-

Acceptance of her explanations is seriously prejudiced by the
statement attributed to her regarding one of the absences on a
Friday, which she does not seriously dispute or deny, that "because
it was a Friday, it was not necessary to come in for a single day
that week."

I find nothing in the contract which excuses the

grievant from failing to meet these obligations during the period
of absences.
Also, the grievant's reasons and explanations for her
absences are immaterial.

It is well settled that unauthorized

absenteeism, for whatever reason, and even if beyond the employee's
fault or control, is grounds for discipline.

The employer is

entitled to and may require a reliable work force.

Especially so

here, in the sensitive surgical service, where the back-log of
clerical work from the absence of the grievant, who was one of the
two clerk-typists in the area, was seriously inimical to the proper
functioning of the service, to the Hospital's continued surgical
accreditation and compliance with requisite legal requirements.
Additionally, the grievant was given a chance by the Agency
to substantiate her claim that part of the absence was due to
illness, by producing a medical certification, but failed to do so
The only remaining issue is whether discharge was the proper
penalty.

I find nothing in the contract or regulations which

nullify or change the well settled industrial relations rule that
discipline for absenteeism be applied progressively.

The traditional

progressive discipline procedure calls for increased penalties
from reprimand, to suspension and finally discharge, over a relevan;

-3period of time, if the offense continues.

The question therefore

is whether the grievant's two suspensions in 1978 are relevant
and sufficiently proximate to the last incident in 1980 to serve
as the necessary disciplinary foundation for the ultimate discharge
or whether they are stale because from two to two and one-half
years elapsed between those suspensions and the later reprimand
and the instant discharge.
I find that the Agency by its own act, has answered that
question itself.

Rather than relying on the 1978 suspensions and

affirming their vitality by discharging the grievant early in
September 1980 for unauthorized absences, the Agency reprimanded
her.

Instead of "progressing" with a more severe disciplinary

penalty following the 1978 suspensions, the Agency began the
disciplinary sequence de novo, by imposing the first recognized
penalty in the progressive discipline sequence.
This is not to say that the Agency did not have grounds to
discharge the grievant at the time the reprimand was given.

Rather

it is to say that reliance on the progressive discipline process
requires compliance with its classical sequence.

To impose only

a reprimand, after earlier suspensions for the same offense, is
to break the sequence, to cast doubt on the Agency's belief in the
continued vitality of the 1978 suspensions, and to start the
disciplinary process anew.
For this reason, I shall reverse the discharge and impose
the penalty sequentially appropriate.
is modified to a suspension.

The grievant's termination

However the grievant is expressly

-4warned that any further violations of the Agency's regulations
concerning absences or any other disciplinary offenses committed
by her would , in the opinion of this arbitrator, be grounds for
summary discharge.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The termination of Mrs. Je-Lain Ringgold
Hunter is reduced to a suspension. She
shall be reinstated without back pay and
the period of time from her termination
to her reinstatement shall be deemed a
disciplinary suspension.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 30, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 30th day of November, 1981 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the forgoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Graphic Arts International Union
Local 274-L

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and

Western Publishing Co., Inc.

The Company has shown a bonafide business need for the
elimination of the grievant's job.

I do not find that the con-

tract clauses cited by the Union barred the Company's action.
Though the Company could have been magnanimous by waiting a
relatively short period longer until the grievant was eligible
to retire, it was not contractually required to do so.

And it

is to the contract and the rights under the contract that the
Arbitrator is bound and to which his authority is limited.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Articles
3, 10, 38 or 41 of the collective
bargaining agreement when it eliminated Charles A. Conte's position as a
lead man in the sheet fed pressroom
effective May 1, 1980.

DATED: June 9, 1981
STATE OF New York )C C •
COUNTY OF New York ) '"

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

7

On this ninth day of June, 1981,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
the same.

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me that he executed

